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Essays In Auctions And Procurement
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Book Synopsis Essays on Structural Analysis of Procurement Auctions by : Bin Yu
Download or read book Essays on Structural Analysis of Procurement Auctions written by Bin Yu and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 144 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation addresses the empirical analysis of procurements based on the auction theory, which is known as the structural-form analysis of procurement auctions.
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Multi-round Procurement Auctions by : Lu Ji
Download or read book Three Essays on Multi-round Procurement Auctions written by Lu Ji and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 113 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: My dissertation contributes to auction studies. It analyzes the bidding behavior in multi-round auctions. It is motivated by an interesting multi-round feature observed in the procurement auctions held by the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT hereafter), which adopts secret reserve prices. Prior research has indicated that auctions with reserve prices usually lead to no trade. However, prior research has not paid much attention to the possibility that the seller can auction unsold objects from previous rounds and a trade is therefore still likely to occur. My dissertation provides new theoretical and empirical analyses of auctions with multiple rounds. It first develops a game-theoretic bidding model for the multi-round auctions with non-forward looking bidders. It then establishes a structural econometric model in order to conduct a structural analysis of the INDOT data. Lastly it introduces dynamic features into the model by assuming that bidders are forward looking and uses a dynamic control approach to analyze the bidding behavior and policy issues. The main findings are: (1) rational bidders reduce their markup across periods in multi-round auctions; (2) simulations show that using secret reserve price is sometimes better than public reserve price for the procurement auctioneer; (3) counterfactual analyses indicate that on one hand, when bidders are not forward looking, it is better for the INDOT to use a secret reserve price; on the other hand, when bidders are forward looking, it is better for the INDOT to use a secret reserve price when the discount factor is low and to use a public reserve price when the discount factor is sufficiently high.
Book Synopsis Essays on Procurement Auctions by : Hidenori Takahashi
Download or read book Essays on Procurement Auctions written by Hidenori Takahashi and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Auctions, Contests, and Games by : Vivek Bhattacharya
Download or read book Essays on Auctions, Contests, and Games written by Vivek Bhattacharya and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 184 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis consists of three chapters broadly in industrial organization, with a focus on contests and auctions, and game theory. Chapter 1 develops a new model of multistage R&D procurement contests, in which firms conduct research over a number of stages to develop an innovative product and then supply it to a procurer. I show that the primitives of this model-the cost of research, the distributions of project values and delivery costs, and the share of the profits captured by the firms-are non parametrically identified given data on R&D expenditures and procurement contract amounts. I then develop a tractable estimation procedure and apply it to data from the Small Business Innovation Research program in the Department of Defense. I find that within a particular contests, there is low variation in the values of the proposed projects, which are drawn early in the process, but considerably larger variation in the delivery costs, which are drawn later. The DOD provides high-powered incentives, sharing about 75% of the surplus with the firms. I then suggest simple design changes to improve social surplus but find that many of these socially beneficial design changes would in fact reduce DOD profits. Chapter 2, which is joint with James Roberts and Andrew Sweeting, studies the benefits of regulating entry into procurement auctions, relative to standard auctions in which bidders are allowed to enter and bid freely. Specifically, we study the relationship between auction outcomes and the precision of information bidders have about their costs before entering the bidding stage of the contest. We show that the relative performance of a standard auction with free entry and an "entry rights auction," which restricts participation in the bidding phase, depends non monotonically on the information precision. We finally estimate the model on a dataset of auctions for bridge-building contracts let by the Oklahoma and Texas Departments of Transportation. Entry is estimated to be moderately selective, and the counterfactual implication is that an entry rights auction would significantly increase social efficiency and reduce procurement costs. Chapter 3, which is joint with Lucas Manuelli and Ludwig Straub, proposes a model of "signal distortion" in a game with imperfect public monitoring. We construct a framework in which each player has the chance to distort the true public signal, and each player is uncertain about the distortion technologies available to his opponent. Continuation payoffs are dependent on the distorted signal. Our main result is that when players evaluate strategies according to their worst case guarantees-i.e., are ambiguity-averse over certain distributions in the environment-players behave as if the continuation payoffs that incentivize them in the stage game are perfectly aligned with their opponents'. We then provide two examples showing counterintuitive implications of this result: (i) signal structures that allow players to identify deviators can be harmful in enforcing a strategy profile, and (ii) the presence of signal distortion can help sustain cooperation when it is impossible in standard settings. We then extend our equilibrium concept to a repeated game, show that it is a natural generalization of strongly symmetric equilibria, and then prove an anti-folk theorem that payoffs are in general bounded away from efficiency.
Book Synopsis Essays in auctions and procurement by : George M. Deltas
Download or read book Essays in auctions and procurement written by George M. Deltas and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on the Design of Procurement Auctions by : In-Gyu Kim
Download or read book Essays on the Design of Procurement Auctions written by In-Gyu Kim and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 252 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Risk Management in Procurement Auctions by : Andreas R. Engel
Download or read book Essays on Risk Management in Procurement Auctions written by Andreas R. Engel and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 192 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Auction Markets by : Nicholas James Shunda
Download or read book Three Essays on Auction Markets written by Nicholas James Shunda and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 312 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Procurement, Scoring Auction, and Quality Manipulation Corruption by : Yangguang Huang
Download or read book Essays on Procurement, Scoring Auction, and Quality Manipulation Corruption written by Yangguang Huang and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 115 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation studies the procurement problem with focus on the issue of quality. Most target items of procurement are not standardized goods, but are some customized goods with quality measured by non-monetary attributes. Scoring auction is one of the most popular procurement schemes used in practice. In a scoring auction, each supplying firm chooses its bid as a combination of price and quality attributes according to a pre-announced scoring rule. The scoring rule ranks all submitted multi-dimensional bids and award the contract to the firm with highest score. To implement a scoring auction, quality assessment is necessary, but the buyer usually does not possess the relevant industrial expertise. So the buyer has to hire an intermediary agent and the problem of quality manipulation arises when the quality reports of bids are distorted by the agent. In particular, the agent may exaggerate the corrupted firm's quality score in exchange for bribe. Chapter 1 provides an theoretical analysis on the optimal procurement scheme design problem under quality manipulation. Chapter 2 is an empirical study on scoring auctions. Chapter 3 shows how we can statistically test quality manipulation from scoring auction data.
Book Synopsis Essays on Exclusive Dealing and Procurement by : John William Asker
Download or read book Essays on Exclusive Dealing and Procurement written by John William Asker and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 314 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Multi-item Auctions by : Rao Fu
Download or read book Essays on Multi-item Auctions written by Rao Fu and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 194 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this dissertation, I explore bidders' behavior in multiple auctions which are conducted sequentially or simultaneously. The first and the second chapters examine buyers' bidding behaviors in an environment of multiple simultaneous auctions and show that the wildly-used assumption of proxy bidding is inappropriate in the multiple auction setting. The first chapter proposes two models which try to describe online auction platforms. One model has a fixed ending time and the other does not. I show that incremental bidding strategy can arise out of equilibrium and weakly dominate the proxy bidding strategy. Late bidding is also discussed. I use the data I collect from eBay to test these theoretical predictions in the second chapter. The estimation results basically support the theory part. Incremental bidders who switch among different auctions are more likely to win and have higher payoffs than proxy bidders. The third essay studies the procurement auctions in the Texas school milk market. I define score functions to map the bids from multiple dimensions to one dimension and analyze the factors that may affect the bids of school milk suppliers. After considering the impacts of these factors including backlogs and cost synergies, I can still find some evidences for existence of collusion among the bidders.
Book Synopsis Essays on Auctions and Procurements by : Laura H. Baldwin
Download or read book Essays on Auctions and Procurements written by Laura H. Baldwin and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 364 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Product Quality and Sequential Auctions by : Bing Han
Download or read book Three Essays on Product Quality and Sequential Auctions written by Bing Han and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three studies about product quality and sequential auctions. The first study develops a model of product differentiation in which firms strategically compete in product quality and advertising intensity. Products exhibit a combination of vertical and horizontal differentiation. Consumers' utility has a stochastic relationship with quality, and consumers are more likely to prefer a higher quality good. Consumers face a trade-off between higher quality goods and price. Increased competition leads to less advertising, but may result in higher or lower quality products offered in the market.
Book Synopsis Brieven van Marten Toonder (1912-2005) aan J.H. Enter by :
Download or read book Brieven van Marten Toonder (1912-2005) aan J.H. Enter written by and published by . This book was released on 1948 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays in Industrial Organization: Entry in Multi-Object Auctions and Freemium Packages in Two-sided Markets by : Renato Zaterka Giroldo
Download or read book Essays in Industrial Organization: Entry in Multi-Object Auctions and Freemium Packages in Two-sided Markets written by Renato Zaterka Giroldo and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 127 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the first two chapters of this dissertation, I study the design of multi-object auctions. Using a large data set from the Brazilian public procurement sector, I show evidence that entry is costly and that the mix of products being auctioned off is a first-order effect to understand firm participation. In the first chapter, I find evidence that the data is consistent with a theory of selection. The average entrant has a higher product match with the session, and they are closer to auction locations. Distance affects entry decisions negatively: a 1 unit (100km) increase in the distance to the auction location lowers the odds ratio for entry 0.91 times. At the same time, an additional auction in the set of potential auctions of a firm increases the odds for entry 1.62 times. In terms of variable costs, a 1% increase in the distance to the auction location increases bid by 0.4% to 3.3%. There are also gains of scale in terms of the size of the contracts: a 1% increase in the contract quantity for a given product increases bids by 0.64% to 0.76%. The main force responsible for lowering procurement costs is the presence of additional bidders. I find that an extra bidder can lower costs between 21.2% and 32.4%. These results motivate and feed into the structural model presented in chapter 2. In the second chapter, I continue to analyze this market with the focus on estimating entry costs and answering policy questions. To do so, I build a novel model of endogenous entry in multi-object auction sessions that allows me to disentangle two forces that affect entry decisions: entry costs, and the menu of items of a given session. The model has two stages. In the first stage, firms decide whether to enter an auction session and pay a fixed cost after observing an imperfect signal of their true cost. In the second stage, both the items for which they can bid and their costs are realized, and the auction takes place. I focus the analysis on type symmetric equilibria, where bidders of the same type follow the same entry strategy. In equilibrium, marginal bidders make zero profits. This condition allows me to link the unobserved entry costs to the observed bid behavior of entrants. Having derived the equilibrium of the model, I estimate model fundamentals and turn to policy questions. The estimates provide evidence that entry is more attractive to local firms. I find that their cost distribution stochastically dominates the one from non-local firms. Moreover, conditioned on the number of items a firm can participate in, non-local firms face between 3.9% to 6.5% higher entry costs than local firms. I focus on two counterfactual simulations. In the fully efficient scenario, where firms do not incur any entry costs, I find that procurement costs would be lowered by 22.5% to 40.1%. These are bounds on the maximum cost savings and also quantifies the degree of inefficiency present in this market. The second counterfactual is a partially efficient scenario, where non-local firms face the same entry costs as local firms. This analysis focuses on a selected equilibrium where firms enter the sessions sequentially. Firms are sorted according to a lexicographic order which is determined by the strength of their signal, number of items, and firm type (non-local/local). I find that procurement costs would be lowered by 2.8% to 2.9%. Thus, on this type of equilibrium and by holding on-site auctions, the government indirectly sacrificed some efficiency to the benefit of local firms. In the third chapter, I study the pricing of platforms that offer consumers the choice between a free package, in which consumers are exposed to advertising, and a premium package, in which they pay to not be exposed to advertisements. I characterize its profit-maximizing and Pigouvian pricing, which allows me to analyze the degree to which the platform incorporates consumers' distaste for advertising in its pricing scheme, as well as the trade-offs that emerge between the free and paid packages. The results contribute to the discussion of consumers' overexposure to advertising when platforms behave as a social planner and maximize their value.
Book Synopsis Essays on Firms and Institutions by : Vasily Korovkin
Download or read book Essays on Firms and Institutions written by Vasily Korovkin and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 171 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: My dissertation contributes towards our understanding of firm behavior in weakly institutionalized environments. It consists of three chapters. The first, "Detecting Auctioneer Corruption: Evidence from Russian Procurement Auctions", develops a novel method for detecting auctioneer corruption in first-price sealed-bid auctions. I study the leakage of bid information by the auctioneer to a preferred bidder. I construct a formal test for the presence of bid-leakage corruption and apply it to a novel data set of 4.3 million procurement auctions in Russia that occurred between 2011 and 2016. With bid leakage, the preferred bidder gathers information on other bids and waits until the end of the auction to place a bid. Such behavior creates an abnormal correlation between winning and being (chronologically) the last bidder. Informed by this fact, I build several measures of corruption. I document that more than 10% of the auctions were affected by bid leakage. My results imply that the value of the contracts assigned through these auctions was $1.2 billion over the six-year study period. I build a model of bidding behavior to show that corruption exerts two effects on the expected prices of the contracts. The direct effect inflates the price of the contract. The indirect effect reduces the expected price since honest bidders are trying to undercut corrupt bidders. I find both effects in the data, with the direct effect being more pronounced. My second chapter, "Collusion in Auctions: Evidence from the Timing of Bids", documents collusion between firms using a unique feature of the same Russian procurement data: the timestamps of all bids. Timestamp data allows developing a new method of collusion detection based on the excessive share of simultaneous bids. My method shows that 8-23% of winner-runner-up pairs bid together, which provides a bound on the share of collusive auctions. Next, I document that simultaneous bidding is correlated with higher procurement prices and smaller bid margins in the auctions. We include a battery of controls to state that collusion leads to 8-9% increase in the final price of the contracts and makes joint bids up to 50% closer to each other. The chapter is the first to show how one can enhance methods of collusion detection by using the data on the timing of bids. In the third and last chapter, I study the effects of armed conflict on trade transactions between firms. The chapter examines trade in the aftermath of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict (2014). The geographic concentration of fighting in a few regions allows me to study the indirect effects of conflict on trade, as opposed to the direct effects of violence or trade embargoes. I employ a highly granular transaction-level dataset for the universe of import and export transactions in Ukraine and find that firms from more ethnolinguistically Ukrainian counties experienced a deeper drop in trade with Russia relative to the firms in more Russian counties. The richness of panel data allows looking beyond explanations unrelated to ethnicities, such as increased transportation costs and bans on certain products. Instead, I focus on two ethnic-specific explanations: a rise in animosity and a de- crease in trust. In a stylized model of trade with asymmetric information, I show that one can distinguish these two mechanisms based on whether the effect is more pronounced for homogeneous or non-homogeneous goods, the latter pointing to the trust mechanism. The intuition is that trust mitigates the uncertainty behind goods' quality. Empirically, I show that in contrast to homogeneous goods, the trade of relation-specific goods has not changed differentially across ethnic lines. Hence, I find little evidence in support of a shock to trust. I then use survey data to show that inter-ethnic animosity has indeed escalated in the aftermath of the conflict.
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Procurement Under Bargaining and Asymmetric Information by : Dimitrios Kostamis
Download or read book Three Essays on Procurement Under Bargaining and Asymmetric Information written by Dimitrios Kostamis and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 318 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
