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Endougenous Timing In A Mixed Duopoly
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Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Endogenous Vertical Differentiation by : Lin Liu
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Endogenous Vertical Differentiation written by Lin Liu and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a game of endogenous timing with observable delay in a mixed duopoly with endogenous vertical differentiation in the context of sequential quality and price choice. We find that a simultaneous play in the first opportunity at each stage turns out to be the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which contrasts with the endogenous timing in a purely private duopoly.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Capacity Choice by : Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Capacity Choice written by Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed duopoly where firms first strategically choose their capacity levels and then compete at price level. In equilibrium, firms are shown to set prices simultaneously while capacities are chosen sequentially. This result is in contrast to the assumption of simultaneous order of moves for capacities choice made by Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12 (2007), pp. 1-7) in a mixed duopoly. Besides, we find that there are two equilibria: in one of them the public firm is the leader in capacities and, in the other, the follower.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly and Private Duopoly - 'Capacity-then-Quantity' Game by : Yuanzhu Lu
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly and Private Duopoly - 'Capacity-then-Quantity' Game written by Yuanzhu Lu and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a game of endogenous timing of sequential choice of capacity and quantity with observable delay in a mixed duopoly and a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly, we find that a simultaneous play at the capacity stage or at the quantity stage can never be supported as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE); whereas a simultaneous play at each stage turns out to be the unique SPNE in a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly there is multiplicity of equilibria and all SPNEs require sequentiality at the capacity as well as quantity stage.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly by : Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly written by Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in Mixed Duopolies with Externality by : Toshihiro Matsumura
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in Mixed Duopolies with Externality written by Toshihiro Matsumura and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We investigate endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly with a negative externality. We find that quantity (price) competition yields a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) outcome under a significant negative externality. These results indicate that mixed duopolies yield the same results as private duopolies under a significant negative externality, which is in sharp contrast to the results in mixed duopolies without a negative externality. Unless the negative externality is insignificant, public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership, and public leadership is more robust than the private leadership as equilibrium. If optimal environmental tax policy is introduced, however, private leadership yields the greatest welfare and this an equilibrium outcome in the endogenous timing game under quantity competition.
Book Synopsis A Model of Endogenous Payoff Motives and Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly by : Kangsik Choi
Download or read book A Model of Endogenous Payoff Motives and Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly written by Kangsik Choi and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A model of endogenous payoff motives and endogenous order of moves is analysed in a mixed duopoly. We find that, when a non-negative price constraint is imposed on public and private firms' quantity choice, both firms always choose to be relative-payoff-maximisers, and both simultaneous move and sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium. In contrast, when non-negative absolute profit constraint is imposed, public and private firms always choose to be absolute-payoff-maximisers, and only sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium.
Book Synopsis Endougenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly by : Rabah Amir
Download or read book Endougenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly written by Rabah Amir and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private - domestic or foreign - firm competes with a public, welfare maximizing firm. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in sharp contrast to private duopoly games. We provide sufficient conditions for the emergence of public and/or private leadership equilibrium. In all cases, private profits and social welfare are higher than under the corresponding Cournot equilibrium. From a methodological viewpoint we make extensive use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games in order to avoid common extraneous assumptions such as concavity, existence and uniqueness of the different equilibria, whenever possible. Some policy implications are drawn, in particular those relating to the merits of privatization.
Book Synopsis Mixed Duopoly, Privatization and Subsidization in an Endogenous Timing Framework by : Yoshihiro Tomaru
Download or read book Mixed Duopoly, Privatization and Subsidization in an Endogenous Timing Framework written by Yoshihiro Tomaru and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is the first paper to consider the endogenous timing in mixed duopoly with subsidization. Pal (Economics Letters, Vol. 61 (1998), pp. 181-185) shows that private leadership is always an equilibrium outcome in a mixed duopoly without any subsidy. By including the production subsidy, we observe that private leadership may disappear from equilibrium and that Cournot and public leadership become the likely equilibrium outcomes. Furthermore, we find that when firms have identical technologies the first-best allocation can be attained by the same subsidy before and after privatization even though firms' production timings are endogenized. Finally, we examine privatization with lobbying activities and show that such privatization leads to the deterioration of social welfare.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Information by : Hans-Theo Normann
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Information written by Hans-Theo Normann and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing of Incentive Contracts in Mixed Markets Under Bertrand Competition by : Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz
Download or read book Endogenous Timing of Incentive Contracts in Mixed Markets Under Bertrand Competition written by Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper we analyze whether owners of firms prefer to decide on incentive contracts for their managers sequentially or simultaneously under Bertrand competition. It is shown that, in a private duopoly, if one firm is the leader in incentive contracts the other firm prefers to be the follower and thus in equilibrium firms' owners decide incentive contracts sequentially. However, in a mixed duopoly both the private and the public firm want to be the leader in incentive contracts and thus in equilibrium firms make decisions simultaneously.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Formation by : Hans-Theo Normann
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Formation written by Hans-Theo Normann and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in Multi-stage Duopoly Games by : Toshihiro Matsumura
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in Multi-stage Duopoly Games written by Toshihiro Matsumura and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplet Informationa by : Hans-Theo Normann
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplet Informationa written by Hans-Theo Normann and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in Cournot Duopoly by : Toshihiro Matsumura
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in Cournot Duopoly written by Toshihiro Matsumura and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis An Economic Theory of Managerial Firms by : Luca Lambertini
Download or read book An Economic Theory of Managerial Firms written by Luca Lambertini and published by Taylor & Francis. This book was released on 2017-04-21 with total page 231 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The separation between ownership and control has become common practice over the last century, in most medium and large firms across the world. Throughout the twentieth century, the theory of the firm and the theory of industrial organization developed parallel and complementary views on managerial firms. This book offers a comprehensive exposition of this debate. In its survey of strategic delegation in oligopoly games, An Economic Theory of Managerial Firms is able to offer a reinterpretation of a range of standard results in the light of the fact that the control of firms is generally not in the hand of its owners. The theoretical models are supported by a wealth of real-world examples, in order to provide a study of strategic delegation that is far more in-depth than has previously been found in the literature on industrial organization. In this volume, analysis is extended in several directions to cover applications concerning the role of: managerial firms in mixed market; collusion and mergers; divisionalization and vertical relations; technical progress; product differentiation; international trade; environmental issues; and the intertemporal growth of firms. This book is of great interest to those who study industrial economics, organizational studies and industrial studies.
Book Synopsis Games and Dynamics in Economics by : Ferenc Szidarovszky
Download or read book Games and Dynamics in Economics written by Ferenc Szidarovszky and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2020-04-11 with total page 303 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book focuses on the latest advances in nonlinear dynamic modeling in economics and finance, mainly—but not solely—based on the description of strategic interaction by using concepts and methods from dynamic and evolutionary game theory. The respective chapters cover a range of theoretical issues and examples concerning how the qualitative theory of dynamical systems is used to analyze the local and global bifurcations that characterize complex behaviors observed in social systems where heterogeneous and boundedly rational economic agents interact. Nonlinear dynamical systems, represented by difference and differential and functional equations, are extensively used to simulate the behavior of time-evolving economic systems, also in the presence of time lags, discontinuities, and hysteresis phenomena. In addition, some theoretical issues and particular applications are discussed, as well. The contributions gathered here offer an up-to-date review of the latest research in this rapidly developing research area.
Book Synopsis Firms` Strategic Decisions Theoretical and Empirical Findings by : Kazuhiro Ohnishi
Download or read book Firms` Strategic Decisions Theoretical and Empirical Findings written by Kazuhiro Ohnishi and published by Bentham Science Publishers. This book was released on 2015-04-06 with total page 263 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This eBook presents recent case studies on firms and their strategy employed in specific scenarios and industries. Readers will find, in this volume, an analysis of oligopolistic industries done by using various economic models. These models attempt to explain changes to the competitive environment owing to strategic firm behavior, that is, on the assumption that firms are able to compete effectively and advantageously against rivals through applying strategic initiatives. This eBook investigates the behavior of profit-maximizing firms as well as labor-managed, state-owned and joint-stock firms. Fifteen chapters present empirical or theoretical findings, and develop the economic analysis of firm behavior.
