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Author : Hans-Theo Normann
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 56 pages
Book Rating : 4.F/5 ( download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Information written by Hans-Theo Normann and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Hans-Theo Normann
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 36 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (12 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Formation written by Hans-Theo Normann and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Hans-Theo Normann
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 36 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (681 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplet Informationa written by Hans-Theo Normann and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Luís Santos-Pinto
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 30 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)
Download or read book Making Sense of the Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Markets written by Luís Santos-Pinto and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The prediction of asymmetric equilibria with Stackelberg outcomes is clearly the most frequent result in the endogenous timing literature. Several experiments have tried to validate this prediction empirically, but failed to find support for it. By contrast, the experiments find that simultaneous-move outcomes are modal and that behavior in endogenous timing games is quite heterogeneous. This paper generalizes Saloner's (1987) and Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) endogenous timing games by assuming that players are averse to inequality in payoffs. We explore the theoretical implications of inequity aversion and compare them to the empirical evidence. We find that this explanation is able to organize most of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing games. However, inequity aversion is not able to explain delay in Hamilton and Slutsky's endogenous timing games.
Author : Yuanzhu Lu
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly and Private Duopoly - 'Capacity-then-Quantity' Game written by Yuanzhu Lu and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a game of endogenous timing of sequential choice of capacity and quantity with observable delay in a mixed duopoly and a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly, we find that a simultaneous play at the capacity stage or at the quantity stage can never be supported as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE); whereas a simultaneous play at each stage turns out to be the unique SPNE in a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly there is multiplicity of equilibria and all SPNEs require sequentiality at the capacity as well as quantity stage.
Author : Miguel A. Fonseca
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (664 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in Duopoly: Experimental Evidence written by Miguel A. Fonseca and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Lin Liu
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Endogenous Vertical Differentiation written by Lin Liu and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a game of endogenous timing with observable delay in a mixed duopoly with endogenous vertical differentiation in the context of sequential quality and price choice. We find that a simultaneous play in the first opportunity at each stage turns out to be the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which contrasts with the endogenous timing in a purely private duopoly.
Author : Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Capacity Choice written by Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed duopoly where firms first strategically choose their capacity levels and then compete at price level. In equilibrium, firms are shown to set prices simultaneously while capacities are chosen sequentially. This result is in contrast to the assumption of simultaneous order of moves for capacities choice made by Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12 (2007), pp. 1-7) in a mixed duopoly. Besides, we find that there are two equilibria: in one of them the public firm is the leader in capacities and, in the other, the follower.
Author : Kangsik Choi
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book A Model of Endogenous Payoff Motives and Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly written by Kangsik Choi and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A model of endogenous payoff motives and endogenous order of moves is analysed in a mixed duopoly. We find that, when a non-negative price constraint is imposed on public and private firms' quantity choice, both firms always choose to be relative-payoff-maximisers, and both simultaneous move and sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium. In contrast, when non-negative absolute profit constraint is imposed, public and private firms always choose to be absolute-payoff-maximisers, and only sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium.
Author : Toshihiro Matsumura
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 26 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (321 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in Cournot Duopoly written by Toshihiro Matsumura and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Miguel Alexandre Fonseca
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Playing Cournot Although They Shouldn't - Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopolies with Asymmetric Cost written by Miguel Alexandre Fonseca and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this note, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment in a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric cost. Risk dominance considerations allow to select a unique equilibrium in which the low-cost firm is the Stackelberg leader. The data, however, do not support the theory as simultaneous-move play is modal. Average output choices are in line with the Cournot equilibrium. This suggests that Cournot is a much more robust predictor for competition in markets than theory suggests.
Author : Toshihiro Matsumura
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 16 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (318 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in Multi-stage Duopoly Games written by Toshihiro Matsumura and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Victor J. Tremblay
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing and Strategic Choice written by Victor J. Tremblay and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Cournot establishes a Nash equilibrium to a duopoly game under output competition; Bertrand finds a different Nash equilibrium under price competition. Both treat the strategic choice variable (output versus price) and the timing of play as exogenous. We investigate Cournot-Bertrand models where one firm competes in output and the other competes in price in both static and dynamic settings. We also develop a general model where both the timing of play and the strategic choice variables are endogenous. Consistent with the conduct of Honda and Scion, we show that Cournot-Bertrand behaviour can be a Nash equilibrium outcome.
Author : Marco A. Marini
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Lead, Follow Or Cooperate? Endogenous Timing & Cooperation in Symmetric Duopoly Games written by Marco A. Marini and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The aim of this paper is to extend Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) endogenous timing game by including the possibility for players to cooperate. At an initial stage players are assumed to announce both their purpose to play early or late a given duopoly game as well as their intention to cooperate or not with their rival. The cooperation and timing formation rule is rather simple: when both players agree to cooperate and play with a given timing, they end up playing their actions coordinately and simultaneously. Otherwise, they play as singletons with the timing as prescribed by their own announcement. We check for the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) of such a cooperation-timing duopoly game. Two main results on the emergence of cooperation are provided. If players' actions in the symmetric duopoly game are strategic substitutes and there is no discount, cooperating early (as a grand coalition) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended timing-cooperation game. Conversely, cooperating late (at period two) represents an equilibrium when players' strategies are strategic complements. Other equilibria are also possible. Most importantly, our model shows that, in general, the success of cooperation is affected by the endogenous timing of the game. Moreover, the slope of players' best-replies appears crucial both for the success of cooperation as well as for the players' choice of sequencing their market actions.
Author : Svend Albæk
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 50 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (271 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Game with Incomplete Information written by Svend Albæk and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Toshihiro Matsumura
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 23 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (341 download)
Download or read book A Two-stage Price-setting Duopoly with Endogenous Timing written by Toshihiro Matsumura and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 23 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Luis C. Corchón
Publisher : Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN 13 : 1788112784
Total Pages : 552 pages
Book Rating : 4.7/5 (881 download)
Download or read book Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II written by Luis C. Corchón and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2018 with total page 552 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This second volume of the Handbook includes original contribution by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical as well as new IO topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization and empirical models of R&D.
