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Correlated Equilibrium And Nash Equilibrium As An Observers Assessment Of The Game
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Book Synopsis Correlated Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium as an Observer's Assessment of the Game by : John Hillas
Download or read book Correlated Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium as an Observer's Assessment of the Game written by John Hillas and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Noncooperative games are examined from the point of view of an outside observer who believes that the players are rational and that they know at least as much as the observer. The observer is assumed to be able to observe many instances of the play of the game; these instances are identical in the sense that the observer cannot distinguish between the settings in which different plays occur. If the observer does not believe that he will be able to offer beneficial advice then he must believe that the players are playing a correlated equilibrium, though he may not initially know which correlated equilibrium. If the observer also believes that, in a certain sense, there is nothing connecting the players in a particular instance of the game then he must believe that the correlated equilibrium they are playing is, in fact, a Nash equilibrium.
Book Synopsis Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis by : J.F. Mertens
Download or read book Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis written by J.F. Mertens and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-04-18 with total page 260 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such use was by Arrow and Debreu, with the "birth" of general equi librium theory itself, in using Nash's existence theorem (or a generalization) to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. But this use appeared possibly to be merely tech nical, borrowing some tools for proving a theorem. This book stresses the later contributions, were game theoretic concepts were used as such, to explain various aspects of the general equilibrium model. But clearly, each of those later approaches also provides per sea game theoretic proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium. Part A deals with the first such approach: the equality between the set of competitive equilibria of a perfectly competitive (i.e., every trader has negligible market power) economy and the core of the corresponding cooperative game.
Book Synopsis Correlated Equilibrium and Higher Order Beliefs about Play by : Songzi Du
Download or read book Correlated Equilibrium and Higher Order Beliefs about Play written by Songzi Du and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study a refinement of correlated equilibrium in which players' actions are driven by their beliefs and higher order beliefs about the play of the game (beliefs over what other players will do, over what other players believe others will do, etc.). For any finite, complete-information game, we characterize the behavioral implications of this refinement with and without a common prior, and up to any a priori fixed depth of reasoning. In every finite game "most" correlated equilibrium distributions are consistent with this refinement; as a consequence, this refinement gives a classification of "most" correlated equilibrium distributions based on the maximum order of beliefs used by players in the equilibrium. On the other hand, in a generic two-player game any non-degenerate mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is not consistent with this refinement.
Book Synopsis Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept by : E. van Damme
Download or read book Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept written by E. van Damme and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this monograph, noncooperative games are studied. Since in a noncooperative game binding agreements are not possible, the solution of such a game has to be self enforcing, i. e. a Nash equilibrium (NASH [1950,1951J). In general, however, a game may possess many equilibria and so the problem arises which one of these should be chosen as the solution. It was first pointed out explicitly in SELTEN [1965J that I not all Nash equilibria of an extensive form game are qualified to be selected as the solution, since an equilibrium may prescribe irrational behavior at unreached parts of the game tree. Moreover, also for normal form games not all Nash equilibria are eligible, since an equilibrium need not be robust with respect to slight perturba tions in the data of the game. These observations lead to the conclusion that the Nash equilibrium concept has to be refined in order to obtain sensible solutions for every game. In the monograph, various refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept are studied. Some of these have been proposed in the literature, but others are presented here for the first time. The objective is to study the relations between these refine ments;to derive characterizations and to discuss the underlying assumptions. The greater part of the monograph (the chapters 2-5) is devoted to the study of normal form games. Extensive form games are considered in chapter 6.
Download or read book Game Theory written by Steven N. Durlauf and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-07-14 with total page 391 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Specially selected from The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2nd edition, each article within this compendium covers the fundamental themes within the discipline and is written by a leading practitioner in the field. A handy reference tool.
Book Synopsis Existence and Stability of Nash Equilibrium by : Guilherme Carmona
Download or read book Existence and Stability of Nash Equilibrium written by Guilherme Carmona and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2013 with total page 153 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The book aims at describing the recent developments in the existence and stability of Nash equilibrium. The two topics are central to game theory and economics and have been extensively researched. Recent results on existence and stability of Nash equilibrium are scattered and the relationship between them has not been explained clearly. The book will make these results easily accessible and understandable to researchers in the field. Book jacket.
Book Synopsis Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria by : Eric van Damme
Download or read book Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria written by Eric van Damme and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 354 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I have been pleased with the favourable reception of the first edition of this book and I am grateful to have the opportunity to prepare this second edition. In this revised and enlarged edition I corrected some misprints and errors that occurred in the first edition (fortunately I didn't find too many) and I added a large number of notes that give the reader an impression of what kind of results have been obtained since the first edition was printed and that give an indication of the direction the subject is taking. Many of the notes discuss (or refer to papers discussing) applications of the refinements that are considered. Of course, it is the quantity and the quality of the insights and the applications that lend the refinements their validity. Although the guide to the applications is far from complete, the notes certainly allow the reader to form a good judgement of which refinements have really yielded new insights. Hence, as in the first edition, I will refrain from speculating on which refinements of Nash equilibria will survive in the long run. To defend this position let me also cite Binmore [1990] who compares writing about refinements to the Herculean task of defeating the nine-headed Hydra which grew too heads for each that was struck off. It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to thank my secretary, Marjoleine de Wit, who skilfully and, as always, cheerfully typed the manuscript and did the proofreading.
Book Synopsis Correlated Equilibrium, Public Signalling and Absorbing Games by : Eilon Solan
Download or read book Correlated Equilibrium, Public Signalling and Absorbing Games written by Eilon Solan and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Rationality and Extensive Form Correlated Equilibria in Stochastic Games by : Eilon Solan
Download or read book Rationality and Extensive Form Correlated Equilibria in Stochastic Games written by Eilon Solan and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information by : Dirk Bergemann
Download or read book Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information written by Dirk Bergemann and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics by :
Download or read book The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics written by and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-05-18 with total page 7493 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The award-winning The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition is now available as a dynamic online resource. Consisting of over 1,900 articles written by leading figures in the field including Nobel prize winners, this is the definitive scholarly reference work for a new generation of economists. Regularly updated! This product is a subscription based product.
Book Synopsis Common Knowledge, Nash Equilibrium and Correlated Equilibrium by : Helen Yan Huang
Download or read book Common Knowledge, Nash Equilibrium and Correlated Equilibrium written by Helen Yan Huang and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 276 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Epistemic Game Theory by : Andrés Perea
Download or read book Epistemic Game Theory written by Andrés Perea and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2012-06-07 with total page 581 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.
Book Synopsis Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games by : Dirk Bergemann
Download or read book Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games written by Dirk Bergemann and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the players receive in the game.We characterize the set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibrium if players observe the given information structure but may also observe additional signals. The characterization corresponds to the set of (a version of) incomplete information correlated equilibria which we dub Bayes correlated equilibria.We identify a partial order on many player information structures (individual sufficiency) under which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. This order captures the role of information in imposing (incentive) constraints on behavior.
Book Synopsis Situation Analysis of Double Action Games by : Jiang Dianyu
Download or read book Situation Analysis of Double Action Games written by Jiang Dianyu and published by LAP Lambert Academic Publishing. This book was released on 2015-11-04 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this monograph, the author introduces Shannon entropy and principle of maximum entropy into n-person strategic games whose every of players has exactly 2 pure strategies. Principle of minimum entropy is put forth. Some 0-1 unmbering and criterons symmetry and duality of the games are given. The method to find pure Nash equilibria and completely mixed Nash equilibria are obtained. Method to solve expected equilibria and corresponding equilibrium analysis based on principle of maximum entropy are researched. Marginal-able correlated equilibria and optimal situation analysis are focused on 2-person and 3-person games.
Book Synopsis Quantal Response Equilibrium by : Jacob K. Goeree
Download or read book Quantal Response Equilibrium written by Jacob K. Goeree and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2016-06-28 with total page 328 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Quantal Response Equilibrium presents a stochastic theory of games that unites probabilistic choice models developed in psychology and statistics with the Nash equilibrium approach of classical game theory. Nash equilibrium assumes precise and perfect decision making in games, but human behavior is inherently stochastic and people realize that the behavior of others is not perfectly predictable. In contrast, QRE models choice behavior as probabilistic and extends classical game theory into a more realistic and useful framework with broad applications for economics, political science, management, and other social sciences. Quantal Response Equilibrium spans the range from basic theoretical foundations to examples of how the principles yield useful predictions and insights in strategic settings, including voting, bargaining, auctions, public goods provision, and more. The approach provides a natural framework for estimating the effects of behavioral factors like altruism, reciprocity, risk aversion, judgment fallacies, and impatience. New theoretical results push the frontiers of models that include heterogeneity, learning, and well-specified behavioral modifications of rational choice and rational expectations. The empirical relevance of the theory is enhanced by discussion of data from controlled laboratory experiments, along with a detailed users' guide for estimation techniques. Quantal Response Equilibrium makes pioneering game-theoretic methods and interdisciplinary applications available to a wide audience.
Book Synopsis Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory by : Tamer Basar
Download or read book Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory written by Tamer Basar and published by SIAM. This book was released on 1999-01-01 with total page 526 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Recent interest in biological games and mathematical finance make this classic 1982 text a necessity once again. Unlike other books in the field, this text provides an overview of the analysis of dynamic/differential zero-sum and nonzero-sum games and simultaneously stresses the role of different information patterns. The first edition was fully revised in 1995, adding new topics such as randomized strategies, finite games with integrated decisions, and refinements of Nash equilibrium. Readers can now look forward to even more recent results in this unabridged, revised SIAM Classics edition. Topics covered include static and dynamic noncooperative game theory, with an emphasis on the interplay between dynamic information patterns and structural properties of several different types of equilibria; Nash and Stackelberg solution concepts; multi-act games; Braess paradox; differential games; the relationship between the existence of solutions of Riccati equations and the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions; and infinite-horizon differential games.
