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Author : Estelle Cantillon
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 73 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (123 download)
Download or read book Combination Bidding in Multi-unit Auctions written by Estelle Cantillon and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 73 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Estelle Cantillon
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 73 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (15 download)
Download or read book Combination Biddings in Multi-unit Auctions written by Estelle Cantillon and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 73 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Anup K. Sen
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 29 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)
Download or read book How to Bid Effectively in Multi-Unit Multi-Item Combinatorial Auctions written by Anup K. Sen and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: When a bid is placed on a package in a combinatorial auction (CA), the bid value must be large enough to ensure that the package remains in contention for inclusion in winning combinations in future. The Deadness Level (DL) of a package can serve as an ask price on a fresh bid that can be meaningfully placed on it. Package DL values in single-unit CAs are readily determined. In recent years, however, interest in multi-unit CAs has grown rapidly. The number of packages can be very large in this case, and bidders need greater guidance in estimating valuations. But the DL value of a package tends to creep upwards unsteadily as more bids are placed, and no closed form expression or computational method has been found for it as yet. Here we present for the first time an exact method for determining package DLs in the multi-unit case, assuming that an OR bidding language is being used. A dynamic programming implementation is described that enables fast incremental computations of ask prices after each bid. Experimental runs on simulated data and live data from a recent U.K. multi-unit spectrum auction show that the memory requirement is not excessive. Thus the proposed method could help to promote bidder participation in online multi-unit eBay-like CAs in the procurement and sale of commodities.
Author : Rebecca Catherine Elskamp
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (125 download)
Download or read book Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions written by Rebecca Catherine Elskamp and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis contains three essays on the topic of bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions. The first essay develops and experimentally tests multi-unit auction theory to identify the effects of "scaling up" multi-unit auction environments on individual bidding behaviour. A uniquely tractable environment is developed that leads to the construction of uniform auctions of different scales, where the prediction is that risk neutral bidders' bids on the last unit they demand are independent of scale. Two main effects were observed in the experimental data. Regardless of scale, bidders were found to bid more aggressively than predicted by the theory. Secondly, small scale effects were observed, as bids were more aggressive in the small scale relative to the larger scale treatment. The theoretical consequences of risk aversion, joy of winning, and anticipated regret are analyzed to explain these deviations from predictions. The second essay provides empirical evidence on how economic agents converge to optimality. Learning direction theory is applied to bidding behaviour from the Ontario dairy quota auction, following a change in pricing rule from uniform to discriminatory. Two dimensions of bidding behaviour are examined at the individual bidder level, bid prices and number of price-quantity bid pairs. Adjustments in bidding behaviour are broadly consistent with the ex-post rationality. Experience acquired under the discriminatory pricing rule is found to have diminishing effects on adjustments made to bidding behaviour, consistent with bidders converging towards optimality. The third essay examines the effect of two simultaneous policy changes, implemented in the Ontario dairy quota auction, to determine whether these changes were successful in achieving performance goals. Results of a series of regression models indicate that these two policy changes had no effect on clearing prices. Rather, these two policy changes were found to significantly reduce revenue from quantity purchased, total quantity transferred and total quantity offered. The combination of a significant reduction in bid prices and individual quantity demanded, paralleled by an increase in individual quantity offered appears to have been the underlying mechanisms, in terms of individual bidding/offering behaviour, through which the these two policies failed to meet performance goals.
Author : Vijay Krishna
Publisher : Elsevier
ISBN 13 : 0080475965
Total Pages : 318 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (84 download)
Download or read book Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2002-04-25 with total page 318 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Auction Theory is the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. The book develops the main concepts of auction theory from scratch in a self-contained and theoretically rigorous manner. It explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information through detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory. This book complements its superb presentation of auction theory with clear and concise proofs of all results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization. It provides discussions on auction-related subjects, including private value auctions; the Revenue Equivalence Principle; auctions with interdependent values; the Revenue Ranking (Linkage) Principle; mechanism design with interdependent values; bidding rings; multiple object auctions; equilibrium and efficiency with private values; and nonidentical objects. This book is essential reading for graduate students taking courses on auction theory, the economics of information, or the economics of incentives, as well as for any serious student of auctions. It will also appeal to professional economists or business analysts working in contract theory, experimental economics, industrial organization, and microeconomic theory. *The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions*Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information*Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory
Author : Sebastian Schwenen
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 29 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (847 download)
Download or read book Strategic Bidding in Multi-unit Auctions with Capacity Constrained Bidders written by Sebastian Schwenen and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (535 download)
Download or read book Multi-unit Auctions in which Almost Every Bid Wins written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Dirk Engelmann
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Bidding Behavior in Multi-unit Auctions written by Dirk Engelmann and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with at demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units. We also provide some theoretical insights concerning the equilibria of uniform-price auctions with incomplete information.
Author : Minjie Shao
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 91 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (769 download)
Download or read book Two Essays on Bidding in Multi-unit Common Value Auctions written by Minjie Shao and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 91 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of two essays on the topic of bidding in multi-unit common value auction. Essay one examines the role of capacity constraint on the auction results and bidding behavior. We consider a general case where bidders are unconstrained, and a second setting where bidders are capacity constrained. We document downward sloping demand curves for individual bidders. Bidders shade their bids by submitting quantity-price pairs and spreading their bids. The winner's curse is strong in the unconstrained treatment, but we find no evidence of the winner's curse when bidding constraints are imposed. Unconstrained bidders shade bids significantly more and their quantity-weighted prices are much lower than those in the constrained treatment. Interacting with the information structure, the capacity constraint has a significant impact on the auction results including the market clearing price, market efficiency, and the degree of market concentration. We provide evidence that efficient price discovery in multi-unit auctions with diverse information is possible, but careful attention to auction design will make this outcome more likely. Essay two examines how the introduction of a noncompetitive bidding option affects outcomes in a multi-unit uniform-price auction. The experimental design incorporates many of the characteristics of the markets that pertain to the issuance of new equity securities. Important features of the bidding environment include endogenous bidder entry, costly information acquisition, bidders that differ by capacity constraint, and substantial uncertainty with respect to the intrinsic value. We use a standard uniform-price auction as our baseline setting where only competitive bids are accepted. Our results show that introducing the noncompetitive bidding option improves auction performance by increasing revenue and reducing price error. Underpricing is found in both treatments, but is less severe in the presence of the noncompetitive bidding option. The incorporation of this option significantly increases both the small bidder participation rate and allocation, and reduces the incentive for small bidders to free ride by submitting extremely high bids. Under both treatments, information acquisition increases large bidders' profits but proves unprofitable for small bidders, and pricing accuracy is increasing in the rate of information acquisition.
Author : Kjell G. Nyborg
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)
Download or read book Bidder Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions - Evidence from Swedish Treasury Auctions written by Kjell G. Nyborg and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions, which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auction awards in over 400 Swedish Treasury auctions. First, we document that bidders vary their prices, bid dispersion, and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding. Second, we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner's curse-driven model in which each bidder submits only one bid, despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategies. Third, we explore the extent to which the received theories of multiunit auctions are able to offer insights into the bidder behavior we observe. Our empirical evidence is consistent with some of the predictions of the models of auctions that emphasize private information, the winner's curse, and the champion's plague. While the models of multiunit auctions serve as useful guideposts, our empirical findings also point to several new areas of research in multiunit auctions that are of policy and theoretical interest.
Author : Flavio M. Menezes
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 42 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (318 download)
Download or read book Auctions of Identical Objects with Single-unit Demands written by Flavio M. Menezes and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Jinsoo Bae (Ph. D. in economics)
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 114 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (123 download)
Download or read book Essays on Multi-unit Auctions written by Jinsoo Bae (Ph. D. in economics) and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 114 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Chapter 3 studies a pro-competitive effect of joint bidding in multi-unit uniform price auctions where bidders have private values and demand different quantities of units. I analyze a simple model with three identical items for sale, two small bidders each demanding a single unit, and a big bidder demanding two units. I show that joint bidding of the two small bidders, which recovers the symmetry of bidders, enhances competition among the bidders and increases efficiency and revenue of the auction.
Author : Paul Milgrom
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 1139449168
Total Pages : 378 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (394 download)
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author : Wedad Jasmine Elmaghraby
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 232 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (34 download)
Download or read book Multi-unit Auctions with Complementarities written by Wedad Jasmine Elmaghraby and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 232 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : David McAdams
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 30 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (531 download)
Download or read book Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-unit Auctions written by David McAdams and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In a large class of multi-unit auctions of identical objects that includes the uniform-price, as-bid (or discriminatory), and Vickrey auctions, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in monotone pure strategies whenever there is a finite price / quantity grid and each bidder's interim expected payoff function satisfies single-crossing in own bid and type. A stronger condition, non-decreasing differences in own bid and type, is satisfied in this class of auctions given (a) independent types and (b) risk-neutral bidders with marginal values that are (c) nondecreasing in own type and have (d) non-increasing differences in own type and others' quantities. A key observation behind this analysis is that each bidder's valuation for what he wins is always modular in own bid in any multi-unit auction in which the allocation is determined by market-clearing. This paper also provides the first proof of pure strategy equilibrium existence in the uniform-price auction when bidders have multi-unit demand and values that are not private. Keywords: Autions, Multi-unit Auctions, Uniform-price Auction, Vickrey Auctions Bidders, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Author : Dirk Engelmann
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 41 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (263 download)
Download or read book Bidding Behaviour in Multi-unit Auctions written by Dirk Engelmann and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Shengli Bao
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 44 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (513 download)
Download or read book A Comparison of Two Algorithms for Clearing Multi-unit Bid Double Auctions written by Shengli Bao and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Keywords: e-commerce, double auctions, multi-unit bids, algorithms.
