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Ceo Ownership Concentration And Ceo Csr Performance Compensation Of Sp 500 Companies
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Book Synopsis CEO Ownership Concentration and CEO CSR Performance Compensation of S&P 500 Companies by : Allen Li
Download or read book CEO Ownership Concentration and CEO CSR Performance Compensation of S&P 500 Companies written by Allen Li and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study investigates how CEO ownership concentration in S&P 500 companies is associated with compensation tied to social performance. My theory on how these two variables are connected is presented in the paper. I employ logistic regression on privately collected data on social performance compensation. Using firm-level and individual-level data for over 400 companies, I find that the relationship between CEO ownership and CEO CSR incentive is positively related. In my analysis, I control for leverage, profitability, and industry. I suggest that I recommend that more researches in this area should be conducted in order to properly understand if CEOs are using their ownership concentration to obtain more private benefits for themselves.
Book Synopsis Ownership Structure and CEO Compensation in North America by : Yusuf Nulla
Download or read book Ownership Structure and CEO Compensation in North America written by Yusuf Nulla and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 11 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This research had investigated ownership structure and its impact on CEO compensation system in TSX/S&P and NYSE indexes companies from the period 2005 to 2010. The totaled of two hundred and forty companies were selected through random sample method. The research question for this study was: is there a relationship between CEO compensation, firm size, accounting firm performance, and corporate governance, among owner-managed and management-controlled companies? To answer this question, thirty six statistical models were created. It was found that, there was a relationship between CEO compensation, firm size, accounting performance, and corporate governance, both in the owner-managed and management-controlled companies, except for the relationship between CEO bonus and firm size of owner-managed companies.
Book Synopsis Determinants of Executive Compensation by : Ellen Pavlik
Download or read book Determinants of Executive Compensation written by Ellen Pavlik and published by Praeger. This book was released on 1991-06-21 with total page 184 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book is a thorough study of what determines executive compensation levels, challenging prior research which tended to focus solely on the influence of corporate financial performance.
Book Synopsis The Comprehensive Examination of the Effect of CEO Compensation in TSX/S&P Index Companies by : Yusuf Nulla
Download or read book The Comprehensive Examination of the Effect of CEO Compensation in TSX/S&P Index Companies written by Yusuf Nulla and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 10 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This research study in executive compensation investigated the effect of firm ownership on CEO compensation in Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX/S&P) companies. It had compared the CEO compensation system of owner-managed and management-controlled companies from 2005 to 2010. The research question for this study was: is there a relationship between CEO compensation, firm size, accounting firm performance, and corporate governance, among owner and management-controlled companies? It was found that, there was a relationship between CEO compensation, firm size, accounting performance, and corporate governance, except for the relationship between CEO bonus and corporate governance in management-controlled companies. The correlations between CEO compensation, firm size, accounting performance, and corporate governance among owner and management-controlled companies were ranged from weak negative to strong positive ratios.
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value by : Jennifer Carpenter
Download or read book Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value written by Jennifer Carpenter and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-04-17 with total page 159 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.
Book Synopsis CEO Pay and Shareholder Value by : Ira T. Kay
Download or read book CEO Pay and Shareholder Value written by Ira T. Kay and published by CRC Press. This book was released on 2024-11-01 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: U.S. executive pay, particularly that of CEOs, has been under serious attack for nearly a decade. Despite the fact that tying executive performance and pay to stock price has appeared to have substantially benefited the U.S. economy, this criticism has not subsided. CEO Pay and Shareholder Value challenges some assumptions behind this criticism by addressing these pertinent questions and more:
Book Synopsis CEO Tenure, Performance and Turnover in S & P 500 Companies by : John C. Coates
Download or read book CEO Tenure, Performance and Turnover in S & P 500 Companies written by John C. Coates and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "The centrality of the CEO is reflected in the empirical literature linking CEO turnover to poor firm performance. However, less is known about the institutional and personal correlates of CEO turnover. In this study, we find two CEO characteristics interact with turnover: tenure and ownership. We interpret our results as indicating that CEOs of S & P 500 firms divide into two groups with different tenure patterns -- "owners" (who have large personal shareholdings) and "managers" (who have smaller holdings). The tenure of manager-CEOs (as opposed to owner-CEOs) exhibits a term structure loosely similar to the one produced by the tenure process at academic institutions. Turnover of all kinds is low during a CEO's first four years on the job. In contrast, once a CEO reaches his fifth year, retirements begin a multi-year increase and exits via merger exhibit a large one-year spike. These term effects are strongest for relatively young CEOs, and appear to be independent of such factors as firm performance or retirement norms. We also find that deals and retirements are partially related, but partially distinct, modes of CEO turnover in other respects, which are similar along some dimensions but sharply different along others"--Preface.
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in the U.S. by : Steven Neil Kaplan
Download or read book Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in the U.S. written by Steven Neil Kaplan and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper, I consider the evidence for three common perceptions of U.S. CEO pay and corporate governance: (1) CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing; (2) CEOs are not paid for performance; and (3) boards do not penalize CEOs for poor performance. While average CEO pay increased substantially through the 1990s, it has declined since then. CEO pay levels relative to other highly paid groups today are comparable to their average levels in the early 1990s. In fact, the relative pay of large company CEOs is similar to its average level since the 1930s. The ratio of large company CEO pay to firm market value also has remained roughly constant since 1960. This suggests that similar forces, likely technology and scale, have played a meaningful role in driving CEO pay and the pay of others with top incomes. With regard to performance, CEOs are paid for performance and penalized for poor performance. Finally, boards do monitor CEOs. The rate of CEO turnover has increased in the 2000s compared to the 1980s and 1990s, and is significantly tied to poor stock performance. While corporate governance failures and pay outliers as well as the very high average pay levels relative to the typical household undoubtedly have contributed to the common perceptions, a meaningful part of CEO pay appears to be market determined and boards do appear to monitor their CEOs. Consistent with that, top executive pay policies at over 98% of S&P 500 and Russell 3000 companies received majority shareholder support in the Dodd-Frank mandated Say-On-Pay votes in 2011.
Book Synopsis Corporate Social Performances Incentives in CEO Compensation Contracts by : Rozhin Yousefvand-Mansouri
Download or read book Corporate Social Performances Incentives in CEO Compensation Contracts written by Rozhin Yousefvand-Mansouri and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "This study extends the literature on the relation between executive compensation, Corporate Social Performance (CSP), and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) by illustrating how the relation between CSP and CFP is informative in setting executive compensation. Given the role of the board of directors (BOD) in setting executive compensation, I discuss the BOD' fiduciary duty in the contexts of corporate social responsibility by referring to American corporate law and explain how the fiduciary duty of the BOD accommodates and does not prevent Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), even if complying with CSR goes against shareholders' wealth maximization. Moreover, by combining contract theory literature with economics literature, I propose a theoretical framework which illustrates that contracting on CSP is effective only in situations when corporate social performance negatively affects financial performance and that contracting on CSP is inefficient when CSP is positively reflected in CFP. Next, I examine the framework by focusing on employee health and safety aspects of CSR in extractive industries, using the Total Reportable Incident Rate (TRIR) as the measure of CSP. I find that for companies with a TRIR target in their executive compensation, the relation between TRIR and financial performance is significantly lower than for companies without a CSP target. Furthermore, relying on the disclosures provided in companies' annual reports on compliance with safety standards, I measure the degree to which concern about companies' disclosure relates to the negative effect of the costs of compliance or noncompliance with safety standards, and I categorize the companies into those with a low (high) degree of concern about the negative effect of the costs of compliance on financial performance, denoted by FJ CSR companies (FNJ CSR companies) in the text. Consistent with the proposed framework, I find that a lower degree of concern about the negative effect of the costs of compliance on financial performance is associated with a lower likelihood to include a TRIR incentive in the Chief Executive Officer's (CEO) compensation contract. Also, I find that while the changes in safety performance of FJ CSR companies that include safety performance incentives in the compensation contacts of their CEOs does not differ from that of those without such incentives, the likelihood of improving safety performance for the former group is lower than that of the latter group, which is a finding that supports the proposed theoretical framework.In summary, this study suggests that boards of directors (BOD) are concerned about corporate social responsibilities and the negative consequences of not fulfilling those responsibilities. Thus, when the BODs perceive a simultaneous negative CSP-CFP correlation, they provide CSP incentives in CEOs' compensation contracts, encouraging CEOs to take on social responsibilities even though it reduces short-term financial performance." --
Book Synopsis The Importance of Firm Ownership on CEO Compensation by : Yusuf Nulla
Download or read book The Importance of Firm Ownership on CEO Compensation written by Yusuf Nulla and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This important study in executive compensation topic investigated the importance of firm ownership on the CEO compensation system in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) companies. This research had compared the CEO compensation system of the owner-managed and the management-controlled companies from 2005 to 2010. The research question for this study was: is there a relationship between the CEO cash compensation, the firm size, the accounting firm performance, and the corporate governance, among the owner-managed and the management-controlled companies? It was found that, there was a relationship between the CEO salary, the CEO bonus, the total compensation, the firm size, the accounting firm performance, and the corporate governance, among the owner-managed and the management-controlled companies.
Book Synopsis Corporate Governance, CEO Compensation and Firm Performance by : John E. Core
Download or read book Corporate Governance, CEO Compensation and Firm Performance written by John E. Core and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 70 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis CEO Pay and Firm Performance by : Paul L. Joskow
Download or read book CEO Pay and Firm Performance written by Paul L. Joskow and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study explores the dynamic structure of the pay-for- performance relationship in CEO compensation and quantifies the effect of introducing a more complex model of firm financial performance on the estimated performance sensitivity of executive pay. The results suggest that current compensation responds to past performance outcomes, but that the effect decays considerably within two years. This contrasts sharply with models of infinitely persistent performance effects implicitly assumed in much of the empirical compensation literature. We find that both accounting and market performance measures influence compensation and that the salary and bonus component of pay as well as total compensation have become more sensitive to firm financial performance over the past two decades. There is no evidence that boards fail to penalize CEOs for poor financial performance or reward them disproportionately well for good performance. Finally, the data suggest that boards may discount extreme performance outcomes -both high and low - relative to performance that lies within some `normal' band in setting compensation.
Book Synopsis Ownership Contingent Influence of Governance Structure on CEO Compensation by : Bala N. Balasubramanian
Download or read book Ownership Contingent Influence of Governance Structure on CEO Compensation written by Bala N. Balasubramanian and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The study examines the need for changes in the standard governance structure through investigation of the moderating effect of ownership identity and ownership concentration on the influence of standard governance structure on CEO compensation in companies with dominant owners in control.Using data from companies listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE) of India that were a part of the diversified 100 stock index for the period 2007-2012, we find that the influence of standard governance structure on CEO compensation is indeed contingent on identity of the owner and concentration of ownership. Duality is the only governance measure that directly influences CEO compensation in family owned domestic private companies. Gender diversity and proportion of non-executive independent directors directly influence CEO compensation in corporate owned foreign private companies. The direction of influence of non-executive independent directors however supports the possibility of board capture by CEOs. In case of government companies, none of the governance measures directly influences CEO compensation. The key finding of the study are the meagre and in one instance an inappropriate (from governance point of view) influence of standard governance measures. As the decision on CEO compensation in case of companies with dominant owners in de facto control of board and executive management implies 'principal-principal' rather than 'principal-agent' conflict of interest, the results from the study suggest a re-think on the standard governance framework that is designed to deal with the latter conflict. A 2013 legislative initiative disenfranchising interested shareholders from voting on related party transactions including CEO compensation is a step in the right direction but much else remains to be done.Corporate governance frameworks across the world are derived from the frameworks proposed in the US and UK context of dispersed ownership. The framework is designed to deal essentially with 'principal-agent' conflict of interest. This 'one size fits all' approach may not ensure governance effectiveness in several situations that arise in functioning of organizations that require dealing with 'principal-principal' conflict. Our study on CEO compensation in the Indian context underlines the need for governance based on minority-shareholder-centered governance framework.
Book Synopsis CEO Tenure, Performance and Turnover in S&P 500 Companies by : Coates, IV (John C.)
Download or read book CEO Tenure, Performance and Turnover in S&P 500 Companies written by Coates, IV (John C.) and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The centrality of the CEO is reflected in the empirical literature linking CEO turnover to poor firm performance. However, less is known about the institutional and personal correlates of CEO turnover. In this study, we find two CEO characteristics interact with turnover: tenure and ownership. We interpret our results as indicating that CEOs of Samp;P 500 firms divide into two groups with different tenure patterns ndash; ldquo;ownersrdquo; (who have large personal shareholdings) and ldquo;managersrdquo; (who have smaller holdings). The tenure of manager-CEOs (as opposed to owner-CEOs) exhibits a term structure loosely similar to the one produced by the tenure process at academic institutions. Turnover significantly depends on firm performance during a CEO's first four years on the job. In particular, external turnover by sale of the firm peaks a year 4 during a CEO tenure. By contrast, external turnover peaks at years 5 ndash; 6, and plateaus at relatively high levels until year 9 of tenure. These term effects are strongest for relatively young CEOs. We also find that forced exit, retirement, and deals covary rather than substitute for one another as modes of CEO turnover. However, forced exits and deals both relate to poor performance by the firm on different metrics. Our evidence suggests that most internal turnover, particularly after a CEO's first five years, is unrelated to firm performance.
Book Synopsis Corporate Governance in China by : Chaojie Li
Download or read book Corporate Governance in China written by Chaojie Li and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contributes to the international literature by examining the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and firm performance in China, especially under different types of ultimate shareholders, who have differing motivations and objectives regarding the structure of CEO compensation. I use unbalanced panel data from more than 1,300 Chinese A-share listed companies over 2005-2009 and find that performance, especially one of market-based measurement, has a significant impact on CEO compensation. CEO compensation levels have risen in recent years due to economic gains rather than poor corporate governance. Firms that operate under other central government ministries (SOECG) than those of the ultimate shareholder do not use performance as a guideline for CEO pay, although they have the highest CEO compensation level amongst all five groups. The size of the board directors and independent directors are contributes positively to CEO compensation. While the degree of ownership concentration and size of supervision board are negative related to CEO compensation. Moreover, CEO gets higher pay if independent direct especially financial one working province is same as companies headquarter. Most of these results are consistent with my hypothesis. Shareholders, managers, government, and others who must make improvements in China's corporate governance standards should find these results useful. In addition, the findings can offer future research directions.
Book Synopsis Ownership Concentration and Executive Compensation in Closely Held Firms by : Aris Stouraitis
Download or read book Ownership Concentration and Executive Compensation in Closely Held Firms written by Aris Stouraitis and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 53 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Owners-managers of closely held firms effectively decide on the level of their own compensation. We test the relationship between ownership concentration and executive compensation, using panel data for a sample of 412 Hong Kong firms during 1995-1998. We find a positive relationship between managerial ownership and top executive cash emoluments for levels of ownership of up to 25 percent in small and in family controlled firms, and for up to 5 percent in large firms. We also find no sensitivity of pay to performance in small firms. These findings may indicate that in the presence of information asymmetry between owners-managers and outside investors the former may use their ownership rights to extract higher salaries for themselves. There is also evidence that top executives with larger shareholdings may be using dividends as a way to supplement their cash salaries. Further tests show that the observed relationships do not result from a link between compensation, performance, managerial effort, and managerial ownership. With the exception of boards of directors having an auditing committee, we find that boards cannot prevent this form of expropriation.
Book Synopsis Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation by : Rüdiger Fahlenbrach
Download or read book Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation written by Rüdiger Fahlenbrach and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I analyze the role of executive compensation in corporate governance. As proxies for corporate governance, I use board size, board independence, CEO-chair duality, institutional ownership concentration, CEO tenure, and an index of shareholder rights. The results from a broad cross-section of large U.S. public firms are inconsistent with recent claims that entrenched managers design their own compensation contracts. The interactions of the corporate governance mechanisms with total pay-for-performance and excess compensation can be explained by governance substitution. If a firm has generally weaker governance, the compensation contract helps better align the interests of shareholders and the CEO.
