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Brief Amici Curiae On Behalf Of 70 Law Economics And Business Professors And The American Antitrust Institute In Support Of Appellants
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Book Synopsis Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of 70 Law, Economics, and Business Professors and the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Appellants by : Michael A. Carrier
Download or read book Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of 70 Law, Economics, and Business Professors and the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Appellants written by Michael A. Carrier and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In FTC v. Actavis, the Su ...
Book Synopsis Brief Amici Curiae of 53 Law, Economics, and Business Professors, the American Antitrust Institute, and Consumers Union in Support of Appellants by : Michael A. Carrier
Download or read book Brief Amici Curiae of 53 Law, Economics, and Business Professors, the American Antitrust Institute, and Consumers Union in Support of Appellants written by Michael A. Carrier and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In FTC v. Actavis, the Supreme Court held that a brand payment to a generic to delay entering the market could have "significant anticompetitive effects" and violate the antitrust laws. In a narrow, formalistic ruling, the court in In re Lamictal held that such payments were limited to cash. On behalf of 53 professors, the American Antitrust Institute, and Consumers Union, this Third Circuit amicus brief urges reversal.Exclusion payments today take myriad forms, with roughly half taking the form of “no-authorized-generic” agreements by which a brand agrees not to launch an authorized generic during the generic's 180-day exclusivity period. Because the launch of an authorized generic dramatically reduces the generic's profits, a brand's promise not to introduce one provides substantial value to the generic.No-authorized-generic agreements, which a brand enters into in exchange for a generic's agreement to delay entry into the brand's market, are simply a variation on a type of unlawful market-allocation agreement with which courts have long been familiar. The two parties make reciprocal agreements not to compete in the other's allocated portion of the market: the brand agrees not to launch an authorized generic that would compete against the generic, and the generic agrees to delay launching its product that would compete against the brand. In holding that only cash payments are subject to antitrust scrutiny under Actavis, the Lamictal court created a loophole large enough to accommodate an entire industry's worth of supracompetitive profits and missed dosages. Nor would scrutiny of agreements like the one in this case, which provides the generic with a type of consideration it could never have obtained by winning a patent case, have any effect on legitimate settlements that fall within the boundaries of patent litigation.Finally, the district court's analysis purported to apply Actavis but was closer to defying it in (1) using factors the Supreme Court invoked to require heightened scrutiny to instead justify reduced scrutiny; (2) misunderstanding the valuable no-authorized-generic period; (3) deeming procompetitive the elimination of risk that Actavis held is anticompetitive; and (4) divining, on its mere say-so, an absence of harmful “intent.”
Book Synopsis Brief Amici Curiae of 118 Law, Economics, and Business Professors and the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Petitioners by : Michael A. Carrier
Download or read book Brief Amici Curiae of 118 Law, Economics, and Business Professors and the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Petitioners written by Michael A. Carrier and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This Supreme Court amicus brief, filed in Federal Trade Commission v. Watson, explains why exclusion-payment settlements, by which brand-name drug companies pay generic firms to delay entering the market, contravene the policies of patent law, antitrust law, and the Hatch-Waxman Act. It addresses five points. First, the settlements are not consistent with the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress's framework for balancing patent and antitrust law in the pharmaceutical industry, which encouraged generics to challenge patents. Second, the settlements are anticompetitive, serving as a form of market division, which is the practical result when brands pay generics to drop challenges to weak patents and delay entering the market instead. Third, the mere fact of a patent cannot justify the payments. The Patent Office frequently issues invalid patents, and the patents at the heart of these settlements present concern, often covering not the drug's active ingredient but narrower aspects like the formulation or method of use that are less innovative and bear more potential for anticompetitive mischief. Patent policy encourages challenges to weak patents, and the procedural presumption of validity does not justify the settlements. Fourth, exclusion payments are not needed to settle cases in the public interest; history has shown that brands and generics can reach settlements without them. Fifth, the most appropriate antitrust framework employs a “quick look” rule-of-reason analysis that treats exclusion payments as presumptively unlawful. Such a framework recognizes the potentially severe anticompetitive effects of exclusion-payment settlements while permitting the settling parties to introduce possible procompetitive justifications, if any, for their agreement.
Book Synopsis Brief Amici Curiae of 82 Law, Economics, Business, and Medical Professors in Support of Respondent by : Michael A. Carrier
Download or read book Brief Amici Curiae of 82 Law, Economics, Business, and Medical Professors in Support of Respondent written by Michael A. Carrier and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In FTC v. Actavis, the Supreme Court issued one of the most important antitrust rulings in the past generation, finding that settlements by which brand firms pay generics to delay entering the market could violate antitrust law. In March, the FTC applied Actavis for the first time, issuing a comprehensive ruling that offered a ringing bipartisan (5-0) condemnation of this behavior.Impax has appealed to the Fifth Circuit, seeking to overturn this ruling. This brief, filed on behalf of 82 professors of law, economics, business, and medicine, highlights Impax's four erroneous foundations, which seek to (1) overturn Actavis; (2) downplay Impax's concession that Endo made a reverse payment to delay entry; (3) ignore its role in delayed competition; and (4) remake antitrust law to immunize blatantly anticompetitive behavior.The brief requests that the Fifth Circuit affirm the FTC's opinion, which is supported by Actavis, real-world evidence, and longstanding antitrust principles.
Book Synopsis Brief of 22 Law, Economics, and Business Professors As Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent in TC Heartland V. Kraft Foods by : Ted M. Sichelman
Download or read book Brief of 22 Law, Economics, and Business Professors As Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent in TC Heartland V. Kraft Foods written by Ted M. Sichelman and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods, currently pending at the U.S Supreme Court, concerns where patent owners can file suit against corporate defendants. This amicus brief considers and analyzes the policy issues at stake in this case. It concludes that the current venue rule, which allows patent owners to sue corporate defendants in any district in which personal jurisdiction lies, should be retained. First, rigorous empirical analysis shows that limiting venue in the manner proposed by the Petitioner in this case would not have any meaningful effect on the existing concentration of patent cases among the lower courts. Instead, it would primarily shift patent cases from one jurisdiction that is relatively favorable to patent owners to two jurisdictions that are relatively less favorable. Second, Congress has effectively rejected concerns over “forum shopping” and “forum selling” in adopting a statutory venue rule that corporate defendants in nearly every type of federal civil case may be sued anywhere personal jurisdiction lies. This rule is sensible, because corporate defendants should be subject to suit where they have committed substantial harmful acts. There is no reliable, systematic evidence to show that “forum shopping” or “forum selling” in patent law is exceptional when compared to other areas of law so as to justify a special venue rule. Third, even if patent suits were exceptional, only Congress is in a position to craft a rule that meaningfully distributes cases among the various district courts and that is equitable to patent owners and accused infringers alike.
Book Synopsis Brief Amici Curiae of 58 Law, Economics, and Business Professors in Support of Appellants' Petition for Panel Rehearing Or Rehearing En Banc by : Michael A. Carrier
Download or read book Brief Amici Curiae of 58 Law, Economics, and Business Professors in Support of Appellants' Petition for Panel Rehearing Or Rehearing En Banc written by Michael A. Carrier and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 23 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In re Wellbutrin XL Antit ...
Book Synopsis Brief for the American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners by :
Download or read book Brief for the American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners written by and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis In Re Cipro Cases I and II by : Mark A. Lemley
Download or read book In Re Cipro Cases I and II written by Mark A. Lemley and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Brief of 28 Professors of Antitrust Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners by :
Download or read book Brief of 28 Professors of Antitrust Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners written by and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Brief Amici Curiae of Antitrust Law And Business School Professors by :
Download or read book Brief Amici Curiae of Antitrust Law And Business School Professors written by and published by . This book was released on with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Brief of Amici Curiae 56 Professors of Law and Economics in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari in TC Heartland LLC V. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, No. 16-341 by : Colleen V. Chien
Download or read book Brief of Amici Curiae 56 Professors of Law and Economics in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari in TC Heartland LLC V. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, No. 16-341 written by Colleen V. Chien and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) provides that a defendant in a patent case may be sued where the defendant is incorporated or has a regular and established place of business and has infringed the patent. This Court made clear in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 223 (1957), that those were the only permissible venues for a patent case. But the Federal Circuit has rejected Fourco and the plain meaning of § 1400(b), instead permitting a patent plaintiff to file suit against a defendant anywhere there is personal jurisdiction over that defendant. The result has been rampant forum shopping, particularly by patent trolls. 44% of 2015 patent lawsuits were filed in a single district: the Eastern District of Texas, a forum with plaintiff-friendly rules and practices, and where few of the defendants are incorporated or have established places of business. And an estimated 86% of 2015 patent cases were filed somewhere other than the jurisdictions specified in the statute. Colleen V. Chien & Michael Risch, Recalibrating Patent Venue, Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-1 (Sept. 1, 2016), Table 3. This Court should grant certiorari to review the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) because the Federal Circuit's dubious interpretation of the statute plays an outsized and detrimental role, both legally and economically, in the patent system.
Book Synopsis Brief Amicus Curiae of American Antitrust Institute by :
Download or read book Brief Amicus Curiae of American Antitrust Institute written by and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Brief for Amici Curiae Antitrust Law and Economics Scholars in Support of Respondents by :
Download or read book Brief for Amici Curiae Antitrust Law and Economics Scholars in Support of Respondents written by and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Brief for the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Petitioner by :
Download or read book Brief for the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Petitioner written by and published by . This book was released on with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors and Economists in Support of Petitioner by :
Download or read book Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors and Economists in Support of Petitioner written by and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Supreme Court Amicus Brief of Professors and Scholars in Law and Economics in Support of Certiorari, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. V. LinkLine Communications, Inc., No. 07-512 (filed Nov. 16, 2007). by : William J. Baumol
Download or read book Supreme Court Amicus Brief of Professors and Scholars in Law and Economics in Support of Certiorari, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. V. LinkLine Communications, Inc., No. 07-512 (filed Nov. 16, 2007). written by William J. Baumol and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The linkLine price squeeze case from the Ninth Circuit is the most important antitrust case that the Supreme Court could take during the Fall 2007 Term. Amici are professors and scholars in law and economics who have taught, or have conducted research on, antitrust law and the economics of industrial organization. They include William J. Baumol, Robert H. Bork, Robert W. Crandall, George Daly, Harold Demsetz, Jeffrey A. Eisenach, Kenneth G. Elzinga, Gerald Faulhaber, Franklin M. Fisher, Charles J. Goetz, Robert Hahn, Jerry A. Hausman, Thomas M. Jorde, Robert E. Litan, Paul W. MacAvoy, J. Gregory Sidak, Pablo T. Spiller, and Daniel F. Spulber. We agree with the petitioners that the Ninth Circuit has generated an inescapable conflict among circuits, and that the Ninth Circuit's opinion below is incompatible with this Court's reasoning in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004), Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007), and Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). We agree with Judge Gould's dissent in linkLine that Trinko "takes the issues of wholesale pricing out of the case," such that the plaintiffs' only possible remaining theory of harm would be predatory pricing at the retail level - which the plaintiffs did not allege. linkLine Commc'ns Inc. v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. d/b/a/ AT&T Cal., Inc., No. 05-56023, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21719, at *28-29 (9th Cir. Sept. 11, 2007) (Gould, J., dissenting). We also agree with Judge Ginsburg's opinion for the D.C. Circuit in Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 398 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2005), which in turn embraces the conclusion of the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise that "'it makes no sense to prohibit a predatory price squeeze in circumstances where the integrated monopolist is free to refuse to deal.'" Id. at 673-74 (quoting 3A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 767c3, at 129-30 (2d ed. 2002)). The existence of a rule like linkLine has a pervasive impact on business behavior that, at the margin, affects competition and consumers. This deleterious effect extends beyond the telecommunications industry to affect all firms that do business in the Ninth Circuit. These reasons justify granting certiorari in linkLine and reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision. In our minds, an even larger reason than those described above makes it imperative that the Court take this case. The Ninth Circuit's decision in linkLine implicates the normative foundation of modern Sherman Act jurisprudence: that antitrust law exists to advance consumer welfare. We have three points to make. First, any rule of price-squeeze liability that threatens liability based on the claim that the difference between a firm's upstream and downstream prices leaves downstream rivals insufficient margin substitutes a rule of competitor welfare for consumer welfare. Second, properly understood, a price squeeze is a regulatory issue, which makes sense only as a rule of price regulation in an industry already subject to duties to deal and to control by institutionally competent regulators. Attempting to implement regulatory policy through section 2 of the Sherman Act is ill-advised, both because it makes no sense for courts to re-regulate deregulated or lightly regulated industries, and because courts lack the institutional competence to implement regulation. Third, the Ninth Circuit's rule is of pressing concern precisely because it will deter efficiency-enhancing conduct and competitive pricing. Vertical integration and partial integration are ubiquitous, and firms need to be able to make decisions about such integration without the threat of liability. Vertically integrated firms likewise need to be free to cut retail prices (as long as the prices are not predatory) without concern for rivals - the point of Brooke Group. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's standard is so vague and open-ended that it creates uncertainty and invites litigation; it also permits imposition of liability based on apparently subjective evaluation of disputed and hard-to-prove facts, which will lead to a substantial risk of false positives.
Book Synopsis Supreme Court Amicus Brief of Professors and Scholars in Law and Economics in Support of the Petitioners, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. V. Linkline Communications, Inc., No. 07-512 (Filed Sept. 4, 2008). by : William J. Baumol
Download or read book Supreme Court Amicus Brief of Professors and Scholars in Law and Economics in Support of the Petitioners, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. V. Linkline Communications, Inc., No. 07-512 (Filed Sept. 4, 2008). written by William J. Baumol and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The linkLine price squeeze case pending in the Supreme Court for the Fall 2008 Term is one of the most significant antitrust cases on monopolization law that the Court has taken in years. Amici are professors and scholars in law and economics who have taught, or have conducted research on, antitrust law and the economics of industrial organization. They are William J. Baumol, Robert H. Bork, Robert W. Crandall, George Daly, Harold Demsetz, Jeffrey A. Eisenach, Kenneth G. Elzinga, Richard A. Epstein, Gerald Faulhaber, Franklin M. Fisher, Charles J. Goetz, Robert Hahn, Jerry A. Hausman, Keith N. Hylton, Thomas M. Jorde, Robert E. Litan, Paul W. MacAvoy, Sam Peltzman, J. Gregory Sidak, Pablo T. Spiller, and Daniel F. Spulber. We agree with the petitioners that the Ninth Circuit has generated an inescapable conflict among circuits, and that its opinion is incompatible with the Supreme Court's decisions in Trinko, Weyerhaeuser, and Brooke Group. We agree with Judge Gould's dissent from the Ninth Circuit's decision in linkLine that Trinko "takes the issues of wholesale pricing out of the case," such that the plaintiffs' only possible remaining theory of harm would be predatory pricing at the retail level - which the plaintiffs did not allege. We also agree with Judge Ginsburg's opinion for the D.C. Circuit in Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., which in turn embraces the conclusion of the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise that "it makes no sense to prohibit a predatory price squeeze in circumstances where the integrated monopolist is free to refuse to deal." The existence of a rule like linkLine has a pervasive impact on business behavior that, at the margin, affects competition and consumers. This deleterious effect extends beyond the telecommunications industry to affect all firms that do business in the Ninth Circuit. These reasons justify reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision. In our minds, an even larger reason than those described above makes it imperative that the Court reverse this decision. The Ninth Circuit's decision in linkLine implicates the normative foundation of modern Sherman Act jurisprudence: that antitrust law exists to advance consumer welfare. We have three points to make. First, any rule of price-squeeze liability that threatens liability based on the claim that the difference between a firm's upstream and downstream prices leaves downstream rivals insufficient margin substitutes a rule of competitor welfare for consumer welfare. Second, properly understood, a price squeeze is a regulatory issue, which makes sense only as a rule of price regulation in an industry already subject to duties to deal and to control by institutionally competent regulators. Attempting to implement regulatory policy through section 2 of the Sherman Act is ill-advised, both because it makes no sense for courts to re-regulate deregulated or lightly regulated industries, and because courts lack the institutional competence to implement regulation. Third, the Ninth Circuit's rule is of pressing concern precisely because it will deter efficiency-enhancing conduct and competitive pricing. Vertical integration and partial integration are ubiquitous, and firms need to be able to make decisions about such integration without the threat of liability. Vertically integrated firms likewise need to be free to cut retail prices (as long as the prices are not predatory) without concern for rivals - the point of Brooke Group. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's standard is so vague and open-ended that it creates uncertainty and invites litigation; it also permits imposition of liability based on apparently subjective evaluation of disputed and hard-to-prove facts, which will lead to a substantial risk of false positives.
