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Bank Capital And Incentives For Risk Taking
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Book Synopsis Bank Capital and Incentives for Risk-Taking by : Alistair Milne
Download or read book Bank Capital and Incentives for Risk-Taking written by Alistair Milne and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyse the incentive impact of bank capital regulation in a model with endogenous capital, assuming regulators randomly audit banks and require undercapitalised banks either to bear the fixed cost of new issue or to liquidate. Forward looking banks with sufficient franchise value maintain a buffer of capital in excess of the regulatory minimum. In our dynamic setting we show, amongst other results: that incentives for risk taking depend upon this buffer of free capital, not the total level; and that the regulatory capital requirement has no long run effect on bank risk-taking.
Book Synopsis Bank Profitability and Risk-Taking by : Natalya Martynova
Download or read book Bank Profitability and Risk-Taking written by Natalya Martynova and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2015-11-25 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Traditional theory suggests that more profitable banks should have lower risk-taking incentives. Then why did many profitable banks choose to invest in untested financial instruments before the crisis, realizing significant losses? We attempt to reconcile theory and evidence. In our setup, banks are endowed with a fixed core business. They take risk by levering up to engage in risky ‘side activities’(such as market-based investments) alongside the core business. A more profitable core business allows a bank to borrow more and take side risks on a larger scale, offsetting lower incentives to take risk of given size. Consequently, more profitable banks may have higher risk-taking incentives. The framework is consistent with cross-sectional patterns of bank risk-taking in the run up to the recent financial crisis.
Book Synopsis Bank Capital Regulation and Incentives for Risk-Taking by : Alistair Milne
Download or read book Bank Capital Regulation and Incentives for Risk-Taking written by Alistair Milne and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyse the incentive impact of bank capital regulation in a model with endogenous capital, assuming regulators randomly audit banks and require undercapitalised banks either to bear the fixed cost of new issue or to liquidate. Forward looking banks with sufficient franchise value maintain a buffer of capital in excess of the regulatory minimum. In our dynamic setting we show, amongst other results: that incentives for risk taking depend upon this buffer of free capital, not the total level; and that the regulatory capital requirement has no long run effect on bank risk-taking.
Book Synopsis Monetary Policy, Leverage, and Bank Risk Taking by : Mr.Luc Laeven
Download or read book Monetary Policy, Leverage, and Bank Risk Taking written by Mr.Luc Laeven and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2010-12-01 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We provide a theoretical foundation for the claim that prolonged periods of easy monetary conditions increase bank risk taking. The net effect of a monetary policy change on bank monitoring (an inverse measure of risk taking) depends on the balance of three forces: interest rate pass-through, risk shifting, and leverage. When banks can adjust their capital structures, a monetary easing leads to greater leverage and lower monitoring. However, if a bank's capital structure is fixed, the balance depends on the degree of bank capitalization: when facing a policy rate cut, well capitalized banks decrease monitoring, while highly levered banks increase it. Further, the balance of these effects depends on the structure and contestability of the banking industry, and is therefore likely to vary across countries and over time.
Book Synopsis Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk-Taking Channel by : Mr.Giovanni Dell'Ariccia
Download or read book Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk-Taking Channel written by Mr.Giovanni Dell'Ariccia and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2013-06-06 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We present evidence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy for the U.S. banking system. We use confidential data on the internal ratings of U.S. banks on loans to businesses over the period 1997 to 2011 from the Federal Reserve’s survey of terms of business lending. We find that ex-ante risk taking by banks (as measured by the risk rating of the bank’s loan portfolio) is negatively associated with increases in short-term policy interest rates. This relationship is less pronounced for banks with relatively low capital or during periods when banks’ capital erodes, such as episodes of financial and economic distress. These results contribute to the ongoing debate on the role of monetary policy in financial stability and suggest that monetary policy has a bearing on the riskiness of banks and financial stability more generally.
Book Synopsis Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited by : Mr.Gianni De Nicolo
Download or read book Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited written by Mr.Gianni De Nicolo and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2003-06-01 with total page 25 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study reinvestigates the theoretical relationship between competition in banking and banks' exposure to risk of failure. There is a large existing literature that concludes that when banks are confronted with increased competition, they rationally choose more risky portfolios. We briefly review this literature and argue that it has had a significant influence on regulators and central bankers, causing them to take a less favorable view of competition and encouraging anti-competitive consolidation as a response to banking instability. We then show that existing theoretical analyses of this topic are fragile, since they do not detect two fundamental risk-incentive mechanisms that operate in exactly the opposite direction, causing banks to aquire more risk per portfolios as their markets become more concentrated. We argue that these mechanisms should be essential ingredients of models of bank competition.
Book Synopsis Bank Capital and Risk-Taking by : Stéphanie M. Stolz
Download or read book Bank Capital and Risk-Taking written by Stéphanie M. Stolz and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2007-06-21 with total page 163 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The year-long consultations on Basel II mirror the international popularity of capital requirements as a regulatory instrument. Yet, the impact of capital re quirements on banks' behavior is not fully understood. The aim of this study is to contribute to this understanding by answering the following questions: How do banks adjust capital and risk after an increase in capital requirements? How do banks adjust their regulatory capital buffer over the business cycle? And what is the impact of banks' charter value on the regulatory capital buffer? The research undertaken for this study has benefited from support in terms of ideas, research facilities, and, not least, financial funding. My thanks go first of all to Claudia M. Buch for her constant encouragement, her continuous guidance, and her confidence in my research ideas. My thanks go also to the Kiel Institute for World Economics and its staff for providing a very fertile academic ground for my research and for providing excellent research facilities. In fact, conduct ing this study would not have been possible without the support of my colleagues at the Kiel Institute and elsewhere. In particular, I am grateful to Horst Siebert for providing me the freedom to pursue this topic. My special thanks go to Jorg Breitung, Kai Carstensen, and Dieter Urban for providing input on econometric issues. I am also grateful to Andrea Schertler for the long and productive discus sions I had on various parts of this study.
Book Synopsis Incentives for Risk-Taking in Banking - a Unified Approach by : Thomas D. Jeitschko
Download or read book Incentives for Risk-Taking in Banking - a Unified Approach written by Thomas D. Jeitschko and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper provides a theoretical framework to investigate the relationship between banks' capitalization and risk-taking behavior. The conventional wisdom is that relatively well-capitalized banks are less inclined to increase asset risk, because the option value of deposit insurance decreases as the capital to asset ratio increases. There are, however, at least three shortcomings in the existing theories that cast doubt on the validity of the conventional wisdom: (1) Existing studies have neglected the agency problem arising from the separation of management and ownership. (2) Past studies did not consider risk-return profiles in which higher risk is associated with higher return. (3) Empirical studies on this issue provide only mixed evidence.The aim of this paper is to shed new light on this issue by expanding existing models in two dimensions. First, by incorporating into a single model the three different incentives of three agents - the bank regulator, the shareholder, and the manager - regarding the risk determination by a bank; and second, by introducing four distinct assumptions on the characteristics of risk-return profiles. By combining these two factors, the theoretical model demonstrates that a bank's risk can either decrease or increase with capitalization depending on the relative forces of the three agents in determining asset risk and on various parametric assumptions about risk-return profiles.
Book Synopsis The Relationship Between Bank Capital, Risk-taking, and Capital Regulation by : Stéphanie Stolz
Download or read book The Relationship Between Bank Capital, Risk-taking, and Capital Regulation written by Stéphanie Stolz and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Sovereign Risk and Bank Risk-Taking by : Mr.Anil Ari
Download or read book Sovereign Risk and Bank Risk-Taking written by Mr.Anil Ari and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2017-12-14 with total page 72 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I propose a dynamic general equilibrium model in which strategic interactions between banks and depositors may lead to endogenous bank fragility and slow recovery from crises. When banks' investment decisions are not contractible, depositors form expectations about bank risk-taking and demand a return on deposits according to their risk. This creates strategic complementarities and possibly multiple equilibria: in response to an increase in funding costs, banks may optimally choose to pursue risky portfolios that undermine their solvency prospects. In a bad equilibrium, high funding costs hinder the accumulation of bank net worth, leading to a persistent drop in investment and output. I bring the model to bear on the European sovereign debt crisis, in the course of which under-capitalized banks in defaultrisky countries experienced an increase in funding costs and raised their holdings of domestic government debt. The model is quantified using Portuguese data and accounts for macroeconomic dynamics in Portugal in 2010-2016. Policy interventions face a trade-off between alleviating banks' funding conditions and strengthening risk-taking incentives. Liquidity provision to banks may eliminate the good equilibrium when not targeted. Targeted interventions have the capacity to eliminate adverse equilibria.
Book Synopsis International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards by :
Download or read book International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards written by and published by Lulu.com. This book was released on 2004 with total page 294 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U. S. Commercial Banks by : Robert DeYoung
Download or read book Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U. S. Commercial Banks written by Robert DeYoung and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2010-08 with total page 57 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study examines whether and how the terms of CEO compensation contracts at large commercial banks between 1994 and 2006 influenced, or were influenced by, the risky business policy decisions made by these firms. The authors find strong evidence that bank CEOs responded to contractual risk-taking incentives by taking more risk; bank boards altered CEO compensation to encourage executives to exploit new growth opportunities; and bank boards set CEO incentives in a manner designed to moderate excessive risk-taking. These relationships are strongest during the second half of the author¿s sample, after deregulation and technological change had expanded banks' capacities for risk-taking. Charts and tables.
Book Synopsis International Evidence on Government Support and Risk Taking in the Banking Sector by : Mr.Luis Brandão Brandao Marques
Download or read book International Evidence on Government Support and Risk Taking in the Banking Sector written by Mr.Luis Brandão Brandao Marques and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2013-05-02 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Government support to banks through the provision of explicit or implicit guarantees affects the willingness of banks to take on risk by reducing market discipline or by increasing charter value. We use an international sample of bank data and government support to banks for the periods 2003-2004 and 2009-2010. We find that more government support is associated with more risk taking by banks, especially during the financial crisis (2009-10). We also find that restricting banks' range of activities ameliorates the moral hazard problem. We conclude that strengthening market discipline in the banking sector is needed to address this moral hazard problem.
Book Synopsis Capital Requirements, Market Power and Risk-taking in Banking by : Rafael Repullo
Download or read book Capital Requirements, Market Power and Risk-taking in Banking written by Rafael Repullo and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Should Increased Regulation of Bank Risk-Taking Come from Regulators Or from the Market? by : Robert L. Hetzel
Download or read book Should Increased Regulation of Bank Risk-Taking Come from Regulators Or from the Market? written by Robert L. Hetzel and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2010 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The heavy losses in bank asset portfolios do not reflect an inherent failure of markets to monitor risk adequately but rather the perverse incentives of the financial safety net to excessive risk-taking. The unsustainable rise in house prices and their subsequent sharp decline derived from the combination of a public policy to expand home ownership to unrealistic levels and from a financial safety net that encouraged excessive risk-taking by banks. Charts and tables.
Book Synopsis The Federal Home Loan Bank System by : Deborah Cohen
Download or read book The Federal Home Loan Bank System written by Deborah Cohen and published by . This book was released on 1980 with total page 72 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Banks' Risk Taking Behavior by : Shin Dong Jeung
Download or read book A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Banks' Risk Taking Behavior written by Shin Dong Jeung and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 372 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
