Auction Behavior

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Snipers, Shills, and Sharks

Author : Ken Steiglitz
Publisher : Princeton University Press
ISBN 13 : 0691233861
Total Pages : 300 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (912 download)

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Book Synopsis Snipers, Shills, and Sharks by : Ken Steiglitz

Download or read book Snipers, Shills, and Sharks written by Ken Steiglitz and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2021-08-10 with total page 300 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Every day on eBay, millions of people buy and sell a vast array of goods, from rare collectibles and antiques to used cars and celebrity memorabilia. The internet auction site is remarkably easy to use, which accounts in part for its huge popularity. But how does eBay really work, and how does it compare to other kinds of auctions? These are questions that led Ken Steiglitz--computer scientist, collector of ancient coins, and a regular eBay user--to examine the site through the revealing lens of auction theory. The result is this book, in which Steiglitz shows us how human behaviors in open markets like eBay can be substantially more complex than those predicted by standard economic theory. In these pages we meet the sniper who outbids you in an auction's closing seconds, the early bidder who treats eBay as if it were an old-fashioned outcry auction, the shill who bids in league with the seller to artificially inflate the price--and other characters as well. Steiglitz guides readers through the fascinating history of auctions, how they functioned in the past and how they work today in online venues like eBay. Drawing on cutting-edge economics as well as his own stories from eBay, he reveals practical auction strategies and introduces readers to the fundamentals of auction theory and the mathematics behind eBay. Complete with exercises and a detailed appendix, this book is a must for sophisticated users of online auctions, and essential reading for students seeking an accessible introduction to the study of auction theory.

Auction Format Matters

Author : Mr.Robert Alan Feldman
Publisher : International Monetary Fund
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 34 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (318 download)

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Book Synopsis Auction Format Matters by : Mr.Robert Alan Feldman

Download or read book Auction Format Matters written by Mr.Robert Alan Feldman and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 1995-05 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper evaluates the importance of auction format on bidding behavior and seller revenue, focusing on differences in performance under uniform-price and discriminatory-price formats. The analysis is based on a standard benchmark model from which empirically-testable hypotheses are derived on the optimal amount of bid shading that generates revenue equivalence between the two formats. Applying this model to data from the IMF gold auctions run in 1976-80, we find evidence of statistically significant shading in excess of the theoretically-derived optimum under the discriminatory format. This evidence suggests greater seller revenue under the uniform-price format.

Putting Auction Theory to Work

Author : Paul Milgrom
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 1139449168
Total Pages : 378 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (394 download)

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Book Synopsis Putting Auction Theory to Work by : Paul Milgrom

Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse

Author : John H. Kagel
Publisher : Princeton University Press
ISBN 13 : 0691218951
Total Pages : 419 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (912 download)

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Book Synopsis Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse by : John H. Kagel

Download or read book Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse written by John H. Kagel and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2021-04-13 with total page 419 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.

Bidding Behavior in Internet Auction Markets

Author : Radovan Vadovic
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 180 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (659 download)

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Book Synopsis Bidding Behavior in Internet Auction Markets by : Radovan Vadovic

Download or read book Bidding Behavior in Internet Auction Markets written by Radovan Vadovic and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 180 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this dissertation I study bidding behavior in Internet Auction Markets. I focus on practice called"multiple bidding" which occurs when a single bidder places numerous bids throughout the same auction. Multiple bidding appears frequently in the data but the incentives that motivate it are not well understood. In the first chapter I develop a theoretical model in which multiple bidding is an equilibrium behavior by rational bidders. The model has a dynamic auction with two bidders who can search for outside prices while bidding in the auction. Each bidder has a search cost which is her private information. When outside prices are private (independently drawn and identically distributed), then, there is an equilibrium in which bidders with the lower search costs bid only late and always search, while the bidders with higher search costs bid both early and late and search as if they coordinated their search decisions, i.e., the bidder with the lower search cost searches and the other bidder does not. This equilibrium by itself provides an explanation of two frequently occurring bidding patterns (late and multiple bidding). In the second chapter I study experimentally the effect of early bids in dynamic auctions on how bidders search for outside prices. The design has two bidders participating in an ascending clock-auction during which any one of the bidders can pause the auction clock. This I interpret as placing an early bid. Once the auction is paused both bidders can simultaneously search for an alternative outside price. Results indicate that pausing decisions by subjects impact their subsequent searching for outside prices, i.e., whether a subject decides to search or not depends on whether she has paused the auction or not. Subjects behave as if they coordinated their searching decisions: the bidder who pauses the auction also searches with high frequency and the other bidder does not. Because this type of behavior increases both the efficiency and the profitability of the auction we favor the use of policies that promote early bidding inpractice, such as, longer auctions and lower public reserve prices.

Bidding Behavior at Competing Auctions

Author : Sajid Anwar
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)

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Book Synopsis Bidding Behavior at Competing Auctions by : Sajid Anwar

Download or read book Bidding Behavior at Competing Auctions written by Sajid Anwar and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The existing auction literature treats on-line auctions as running independently of one another with each bidder choosing to participate in only one auction. In fact, in the case of on-line auctions, many substitutable goods are auctioned concurrently and bidders can bid at several auctions at the same time. Recent theoretical research by Peters and Severinov (2001) is highly relevant to the study of bidding behavior in on-line auctions, showing that bidders can gain from the existence of competing auctions. In the light of this work, this paper attempts to provide an empirical assessment of the competing auctions theory. The evidence presented in this paper indicates that a significant proportion of bidders bid across competing auctions and that bidders tend to submit bids at auctions with the lowest standing bid. The paper also shows that winning bidders who bid across competing auctions pay lower prices than winning bidders who do not cross-bid. These findings jointly amount to the first evidence lending empirical support to competing auctions theory.

Auction Format Matters

Author : Robert Feldman
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 30 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)

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Book Synopsis Auction Format Matters by : Robert Feldman

Download or read book Auction Format Matters written by Robert Feldman and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper evaluates the importance of auction format on bidding behavior and seller revenue, focusing on differences in performance under uniform-price and discriminatory-price formats. The analysis is based on a standard benchmark model from which empirically-testable hypotheses are derived on the optimal amount of bid shading that generates revenue equivalence between the two formats. Applying this model to data from the IMF gold auctions run in 1976-80, we find evidence of statistically significant shading in excess of the theoretically-derived optimum under the discriminatory format. This evidence suggests greater seller revenue under the uniform-price format.

Auction Behavior with Non-pecuniary Dimensions

Author : Tanja F. Blackstone
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 17 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (61 download)

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Book Synopsis Auction Behavior with Non-pecuniary Dimensions by : Tanja F. Blackstone

Download or read book Auction Behavior with Non-pecuniary Dimensions written by Tanja F. Blackstone and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 17 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This research examines bidding behavior in a sealed bid first price multi-attribute auction environment. The auction environment is designed to allow subjects to bid on multiple attributes, where an attribute is analogous to a component of a compensation package. Preliminary findings in base case experiments reveal that over successive rounds bids converge to subject's reserve price, independent of the number of sellers in a market.

Networks, Crowds, and Markets

Author : David Easley
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 1139490303
Total Pages : 745 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (394 download)

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Book Synopsis Networks, Crowds, and Markets by : David Easley

Download or read book Networks, Crowds, and Markets written by David Easley and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2010-07-19 with total page 745 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Are all film stars linked to Kevin Bacon? Why do the stock markets rise and fall sharply on the strength of a vague rumour? How does gossip spread so quickly? Are we all related through six degrees of separation? There is a growing awareness of the complex networks that pervade modern society. We see them in the rapid growth of the internet, the ease of global communication, the swift spread of news and information, and in the way epidemics and financial crises develop with startling speed and intensity. This introductory book on the new science of networks takes an interdisciplinary approach, using economics, sociology, computing, information science and applied mathematics to address fundamental questions about the links that connect us, and the ways that our decisions can have consequences for others.

Auction Theory

Author : Pak-Sing Choi
Publisher : Springer Nature
ISBN 13 : 3030695751
Total Pages : 304 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (36 download)

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Book Synopsis Auction Theory by : Pak-Sing Choi

Download or read book Auction Theory written by Pak-Sing Choi and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2021-05-24 with total page 304 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This textbook provides a short introduction to auction theory through exercises with detailed answer keys. Focusing on practical examples, this textbook offers over 80 exercises that predict bidders’ equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along with the seller’s strategic incentives to organize one auction format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. Also included are several exercises based on published articles, with the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided into several easy-to-answer parts. Little mathematical background in algebra and calculus is assumed, and most algebraic steps and simplifications are provided, making the text ideal for upper undergraduate and graduate students. The book begins with a discussion of second-price auctions, which can be studied without using calculus, and works through progressively more complicated auction scenarios: first-price auctions, all-pay auctions, third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle, common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise title, which allows students to pace their studies accordingly. The authors also offer a list of suggested exercises for each chapter, for instructors teaching at varying levels: undergraduate, Masters, Ph.D. Providing a practical, customizable approach to auction theory, this textbook is appropriate for students of economics, finance, and business administration. This book may also be used for related classes such as game theory, market design, economics of information, contract theory, or topics in microeconomics.

Behavioral Interactions, Markets, and Economic Dynamics

Author : Shinsuke Ikeda
Publisher : Springer
ISBN 13 : 4431555013
Total Pages : 668 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (315 download)

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Book Synopsis Behavioral Interactions, Markets, and Economic Dynamics by : Shinsuke Ikeda

Download or read book Behavioral Interactions, Markets, and Economic Dynamics written by Shinsuke Ikeda and published by Springer. This book was released on 2015-09-12 with total page 668 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book collects important contributions in behavioral economics and related topics, mainly by Japanese researchers, to provide new perspectives for the future development of economics and behavioral economics. The volume focuses especially on economic studies that examine interactions of multiple agents and/or market phenomena by using behavioral economics models. Reflecting the diverse fields of the editors, the book captures broad influences of behavioral economics on various topics in economics. Those subjects include parental altruism, economic growth and development, the relative and permanent income hypotheses, wealth distribution, asset price bubbles, auctions, search, contracts, personnel management and market efficiency and anomalies in financial markets. The chapter authors have added newly written addenda to the original articles in which they address their own subsequent works, supplementary analyses, detailed information on the underlying data and/or recent literature surveys. This will help readers to further understand recent developments in behavioral economics and related research.

Auctions

Author : Timothy P. Hubbard
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 0262334739
Total Pages : 266 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (623 download)

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Book Synopsis Auctions by : Timothy P. Hubbard

Download or read book Auctions written by Timothy P. Hubbard and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2016-01-13 with total page 266 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How auctions work, in theory and practice, with clear explanations and real-world examples that range from government procurement to eBay. Although it is among the oldest of market institutions, the auction is ubiquitous in today's economy, used for everything from government procurement to selling advertising on the Internet to course assignment at MIT's Sloan School. And yet beyond the small number of economists who specialize in the subject, few people understand how auctions really work. This concise, accessible, and engaging book explains both the theory and the practice of auctions. It describes the main auction formats and pricing rules, develops a simple model to explain bidder behavior, and provides a range of real-world examples. The authors explain what constitutes an auction and how auctions can be modeled as games of asymmetric information—that is, games in which some players know something that other players do not. They characterize behavior in these strategic situations and maintain a focus on the real world by illustrating their discussions with examples that include not just auctions held by eBay and Sotheby's, but those used by Google, the U.S. Treasury, TaskRabbit, and charities. Readers will begin to understand how economists model auctions and how the rules of the auction shape bidder incentives. They will appreciate the role auctions play in our modern economy and understand why these selling mechanisms are so resilient.

Rings in Auctions

Author : Angelo Artale
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 3642591582
Total Pages : 176 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (425 download)

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Book Synopsis Rings in Auctions by : Angelo Artale

Download or read book Rings in Auctions written by Angelo Artale and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 176 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In auctions, bidders compete with one another in their attempt to 1 purchase the goods that are up for sale • But buyer competition may be reduced or disappear when a ring of colluding bidders is present. The purpose of the participants to a ring is to eliminate buyer competition and to realize a gain over vendors. When all participants are members of the ring, this is done by purchasing the item at the reserve price and splitting the spoils (the difference between the item market value and the reserve price) among the participants. "The term ring apparently derives from the fact that in a settlement sale following the auction, members of the collusive arrangement form a circle or ring to facilitate observation of their trading behavior by the ring leader" (Cassady jr. (1967)). If the coalition members knew other players' values, the problem faced by the ring might be easily solved: the player with the highest value should submit a serious bid and the other members, on the contrary, only phony bids. However, ring participants do not usually know the values of other members. Therefore, ring members have to find out some mechanism which selects the player who has to bid seriously and, eventually, esta blish side payments paid to each of the losers2.

An Introduction to Auction Theory

Author : Flavio M. Menezes
Publisher : Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN 13 : 9780199275984
Total Pages : 200 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (759 download)

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Book Synopsis An Introduction to Auction Theory by : Flavio M. Menezes

Download or read book An Introduction to Auction Theory written by Flavio M. Menezes and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 2005 with total page 200 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Auction theory is now an important component of an economist's training. The techniques and insights gained from the study of auction theory provide a useful starting point for those who want to venture into the economics of information, mechanism design, and regulatory economics.This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of the theory of auctions. It allows students and readers with a calculus background to work through all the basic results, covering the basic independent-private-model; the effects of introducing correlation in valuations on equilibrium behaviour and the seller's expected revenue; mechanism design; and the theory of multi-object auctions.

Auction Behavior

Author : Youxin Hu
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 104 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (658 download)

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Book Synopsis Auction Behavior by : Youxin Hu

Download or read book Auction Behavior written by Youxin Hu and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 104 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: Standard literature on auctions considers isolated markets with bidders that are ex ante identical and independent. My dissertation research considers the behavior of bidders and sellers when they take into account other auctions and bidders' relative roles outside of a given auction. I further extend this investigation through classroom experiments. In the first chapter, I study bidders' optimal strategies under negative externalities (i.e., the auction may incur losses (instead of zero payoffs) to the losing bidders). I construct a model of auction with three bidders. One bidder is special in the sense that if he wins, both of the other bidders will incur a loss; the other two bidders are regular in the sense that as in a traditional auction, if one of them wins, the losing bidders will receive zero payoffs. Intuitively one expects regular bidders to bid more aggressively than normal to avoid the loss. However, I find that in an ascending clock auction, in equilibrium regular bidders bid less aggressively and quit before reaching their private values. This occurs because a regular bidder may have to bid above his value in order to win against the special bidder and thus risks negative profit by bidding aggressively. Since both regular bidders avoid the externality if either wins, there is a free riding incentive. Despite free riding, in most cases the clock auction is ex post efficient However, in first-price sealed bid auctions free riding and aggressive bidding incentives are simultaneous, so ex post efficiency is less frequent. I also conducted classroom experiments which suggest that bidders more often exhibit aggressive bidding rather than free riding in an ascending clock auction; furthermore, I show that in first-price sealed bid auctions, regular bidders bid more aggressively than the special bidder, indicating aggressive bidding incentives dominate free riding incentives. In the second chapter, I construct an auction model in which both number of bidders and sellers' reserve prices are endogenously determined, and estimate the value distribution among eBay bidders. I assume each bidder has a choice of auctions with different reserve prices and other auction specific factors (seller's reputation, shipping cost, auction duration, etc.). I show that in equilibrium, 1) each bidder must be indifferent to entry in any auction, and 2) each seller's reserve price must maximize expected revenue given auction structure and bidder entry behavior, which jointly determines the equilibrium number of bidders in each auction. Few theoretical works have been done to find the positive optimal reserve price when the number of bidder is endogenous. And previous empirical work usually uses observed bids to estimate bidders' value distribution and take sellers' choice (e.g., reserve prices) as exogenous. Based on the equilibrium relationship described above, my model allows estimation of bidders' value distribution not only from observed bids, but also from the number of bidders and reserve prices. To apply this structural estimation method, I use eBay digital camera auction data to estimate bidders' value distribution from bid observations and reserve prices.

Auction Theory

Author : Vijay Krishna
Publisher : Academic Press
ISBN 13 : 0080922937
Total Pages : 337 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (89 download)

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Book Synopsis Auction Theory by : Vijay Krishna

Download or read book Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2009-09-28 with total page 337 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points

Does the Absence of Human Sellers Bias Bidding Behavior in Auction Experiments?

Author : Björn Bartling
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 19 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)

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Book Synopsis Does the Absence of Human Sellers Bias Bidding Behavior in Auction Experiments? by : Björn Bartling

Download or read book Does the Absence of Human Sellers Bias Bidding Behavior in Auction Experiments? written by Björn Bartling and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 19 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the impact of human subjects in the role of a seller on bidding in experimental second-price auctions. Overbidding is a robust finding in second-price auctions, and spite among bidders has been advanced as an explanation. If spite extends to the seller, then the absence of human sellers who receive the auction revenue may bias upwards the bidding behavior in existing experimental auctions. We derive the equilibrium bidding function in a model where bidders have preferences regarding both the payoffs of other bidders and the seller's revenue. Overbidding is optimal when buyers are spiteful only towards other buyers. However, optimal bids are lower and potentially even truthful when spite extends to the seller. We experimentally test the model predictions by exogenously varying the presence of human subjects in the roles of the seller and competing bidders. We do not detect a systematic effect of the presence of a human seller on overbidding. We conclude that overbidding is not an artefact of the standard experimental implementation of second-price auctions in which human sellers are absent.