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Algorithmic Price Recommendations And Collusion
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Book Synopsis Algorithmic Price Recommendations and Collusion by : Matthias Hunold
Download or read book Algorithmic Price Recommendations and Collusion written by Matthias Hunold and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper investigates the collusive and competitive effects of algorithmic price recommendations on market outcomes. These recommendations are often non-binding and common in many markets, especially on online platforms. We develop a theoretical framework and derive two algorithms that recommend collusive pricing strategies. Utilizing a laboratory experiment, we find that sellers condition their prices on the recommendation of the algorithms. The algorithm with a soft punishment strategy lowers market prices and has a pro-competitive effect. The algorithm that recommends a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy increases the range of market outcomes, including more collusive ones. Variations in economic preferences lead to heterogeneous treatment effects and explain the results.
Book Synopsis Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing and Collusion by : Emilio Calvano
Download or read book Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing and Collusion written by Emilio Calvano and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Pricing algorithms are increasingly replacing human decision making in real marketplaces. To inform the competition policy debate on possible consequences, we run experiments with pricing algorithms powered by Artificial Intelligence in controlled environments (computer simulations). In particular, we study the interaction among a number of Q-learning algorithms in the context of a workhorse oligopoly model of price competition with Logit demand and constant marginal costs. We show that the algorithms consistently learn to charge supra-competitive prices, without communicating with each other. The high prices are sustained by classical collusive strategies with a finite punishment phase followed by a gradual return to cooperation. This finding is robust to asymmetries in cost or demand and to changes in the number of players.
Book Synopsis Virtual Competition by : Ariel Ezrachi
Download or read book Virtual Competition written by Ariel Ezrachi and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2016-11-14 with total page 365 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: “A fascinating book about how platform internet companies (Amazon, Facebook, and so on) are changing the norms of economic competition.” —Fast Company Shoppers with a bargain-hunting impulse and internet access can find a universe of products at their fingertips. But is there a dark side to internet commerce? This thought-provoking exposé invites us to explore how sophisticated algorithms and data-crunching are changing the nature of market competition, and not always for the better. Introducing into the policy lexicon terms such as algorithmic collusion, behavioral discrimination, and super-platforms, Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E. Stucke explore the resulting impact on competition, our democratic ideals, our wallets, and our well-being. “We owe the authors our deep gratitude for anticipating and explaining the consequences of living in a world in which black boxes collude and leave no trails behind. They make it clear that in a world of big data and algorithmic pricing, consumers are outgunned and antitrust laws are outdated, especially in the United States.” —Science “A convincing argument that there can be a darker side to the growth of digital commerce. The replacement of the invisible hand of competition by the digitized hand of internet commerce can give rise to anticompetitive behavior that the competition authorities are ill equipped to deal with.” —Burton G. Malkiel, Wall Street Journal “A convincing case for the need to rethink competition law to cope with algorithmic capitalism’s potential for malfeasance.” —John Naughton, The Observer
Book Synopsis Algorithmic Pricing & Collusion; The Limits of Antitrust Enforcement by : Sumit Bhadauria
Download or read book Algorithmic Pricing & Collusion; The Limits of Antitrust Enforcement written by Sumit Bhadauria and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The combination of big data, large storage capacity and computational power has strengthened the emergence of algorithms in making myriads of business decision. It allows business to gain a competitive advantage by making automatic and optimize decision making. In particular, the use of pricing algorithms allows business to match the demand and supply equilibrium by monitoring & setting dynamic pricing. It benefits consumer alike to see and act on fast changing prices. However, on the downside, the widespread use of algorithm in an industry has the effect of altering the structural characteristic of market such as price transparency, high speed trading which increases the likelihood of collusion. The ability of pricing algorithm to solve the cartel incentive problem by quickly detecting and punishing the deviant further strengthen the enforcement of price fixing agreement. In addition, the use of more advance forms of algorithm such as self-learning algorithm allows business to achieve a tacitly collusive outcome in limited market characteristic even without communication between humans. This raises the fundamental challenge for anti-cartel enforcement as the current law in most jurisdictions is ill-equipped to deal with algorithmic facilitated tacit collusion. The legality of tacit collusion is questionable primarily because the pricing algorithm has the ability to alter the market characteristics where the tacitly collusive outcome is difficult to achieve; thus widening the scope of the so-called 'oligopoly problem'. This paper studies the usages of pricing algorithms by business in online markets. In particular, the paper identify the conditions under which the algorithm prices causes the harm to consumers. It seeks to analyze how algorithms might facilitate or even causes the collusive outcome without human interventions. Further, it looks at the legal challenges faced by the competition authorities around the globe to deal with the algorithmic let collusion and examine the various approaches suggested to counter act it.
Book Synopsis Algorithmic Antitrust by : Aurelien Portuese
Download or read book Algorithmic Antitrust written by Aurelien Portuese and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2022-01-21 with total page 182 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Algorithms are ubiquitous in our daily lives. They affect the way we shop, interact, and make exchanges on the marketplace. In this regard, algorithms can also shape competition on the marketplace. Companies employ algorithms as technologically innovative tools in an effort to edge out competitors. Antitrust agencies have increasingly recognized the competitive benefits, but also competitive risks that algorithms entail. Over the last few years, many algorithm-driven companies in the digital economy have been investigated, prosecuted and fined, mostly for allegedly unfair algorithm design. Legislative proposals aim at regulating the way algorithms shape competition. Consequently, a so-called “algorithmic antitrust” theory and practice have also emerged. This book provides a more innovation-driven perspective on the way antitrust agencies should approach algorithmic antitrust. To date, the analysis of algorithmic antitrust has predominantly been shaped by pessimistic approaches to the risks of algorithms on the competitive environment. With the benefit of the lessons learned over the last few years, this book assesses whether these risks have actually materialized and whether antitrust laws need to be adapted accordingly. Effective algorithmic antitrust requires to adequately assess the pro- and anti-competitive effects of algorithms on the basis of concrete evidence and innovation-related concerns. With a particular emphasis on the European perspective, this book brings together experts and scrutinizes on the implications of algorithmic antitrust for regulation and innovation.
Book Synopsis Robotics, AI and the Future of Law by : Marcelo Corrales
Download or read book Robotics, AI and the Future of Law written by Marcelo Corrales and published by Springer. This book was released on 2018-11-02 with total page 245 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Artificial intelligence and related technologies are changing both the law and the legal profession. In particular, technological advances in fields ranging from machine learning to more advanced robots, including sensors, virtual realities, algorithms, bots, drones, self-driving cars, and more sophisticated “human-like” robots are creating new and previously unimagined challenges for regulators. These advances also give rise to new opportunities for legal professionals to make efficiency gains in the delivery of legal services. With the exponential growth of such technologies, radical disruption seems likely to accelerate in the near future. This collection brings together a series of contributions by leading scholars in the newly emerging field of artificial intelligence, robotics, and the law. The aim of the book is to enrich legal debates on the social meaning and impact of this type of technology. The distinctive feature of the contributions presented in this edition is that they address the impact of these technological developments in a number of different fields of law and from the perspective of diverse jurisdictions. Moreover, the authors utilize insights from multiple related disciplines, in particular social theory and philosophy, in order to better understand and address the legal challenges created by AI. Therefore, the book will contribute to interdisciplinary debates on disruptive new AI technologies and the law.
Book Synopsis Algorithmic Tacit Collusion by : Valeria Caforio
Download or read book Algorithmic Tacit Collusion written by Valeria Caforio and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In light of the ongoing debate on algorithmic collusion, this paper intends to answer the following question: should algorithmic tacit collusion be prohibited under EU competition law? By algorithmic tacit collusion it is meant the capability of algorithmic pricing agents to unilaterally engage into tacitly collusive strategies without human intervention (we also call it 'machine-to-machine cooperation' or 'algorithmic interdependent pricing'). Essentially, this practice raises the very same issues as the well-known oligopoly problem. Therefore, to make it prohibited one could envisage the traditional proposed solution of disentangling the categories of article 101 TFEU from the notions of an 'act of reciprocal communication between firms' or 'meeting of minds'. The paper sets out to discuss this option and its implications. It argues that, from a competition law standpoint, although algorithmic tacit collusion remains undesirable, the notions of agreement and concerted practices should not be changed to encompass it. Rather, it embraces a regulatory perspective referred to as 'algorithms by design' which relies on introducing a legal obligation for firms to program algorithms in such a way as to prevent them from setting oligopolistic prices. In particular, while exploring this regulatory proposal, the paper discusses the peculiar case of algorithms that, though designed not to violate antitrust law, end up charging collusive prices. In this regard, the paper develops a second proposal: it introduces the idea of 'outcome visibility' to nail firms to their responsibility. This concept implies the idea that even if firms are not aware that their pricing algorithms are implementing a collusive strategy, they cannot ignore their visible market outcome.
Book Synopsis The Cambridge Handbook of the Law of Algorithms by : Woodrow Barfield
Download or read book The Cambridge Handbook of the Law of Algorithms written by Woodrow Barfield and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2020-11-05 with total page 1327 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Algorithms are a fundamental building block of artificial intelligence - and, increasingly, society - but our legal institutions have largely failed to recognize or respond to this reality. The Cambridge Handbook of the Law of Algorithms, which features contributions from US, EU, and Asian legal scholars, discusses the specific challenges algorithms pose not only to current law, but also - as algorithms replace people as decision makers - to the foundations of society itself. The work includes wide coverage of the law as it relates to algorithms, with chapters analyzing how human biases have crept into algorithmic decision-making about who receives housing or credit, the length of sentences for defendants convicted of crimes, and many other decisions that impact constitutionally protected groups. Other issues covered in the work include the impact of algorithms on the law of free speech, intellectual property, and commercial and human rights law.
Book Synopsis Algorithmic and Human Collusion by : Tobias Werner
Download or read book Algorithmic and Human Collusion written by Tobias Werner and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Algorithmic Collusion in a Price Oligopoly by : Thomas Loots
Download or read book Algorithmic Collusion in a Price Oligopoly written by Thomas Loots and published by . This book was released on 2024 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "This thesis demonstrates algorithmic collusion in a price oligopoly with multinomial logit demand. Of main interest is the scenario where competing firms independently adopt copies of the same price algorithm. One of the key takeaways is that in this scenario, major challenges to achieving and sustaining supra-competitive outcomes can be overcome by the firms. We show this by constructing competitive price algorithms that have collusive capabilities when at least one of the opponents uses a copy of the same algorithm. Importantly, the firms do not have to activate the algorithm at the same time, do not need to use the same input parameters, and do not need to know that they are using the same algorithm. Moreover, the proposed algorithms do not engage in illicit forms of communication or signaling, and therefore exemplify tacit (lawful) algorithmic collusion . This thesis thus contributes to the ongoing debate on the extent to which collusion by algorithms is possible within the confines of existing antitrust law and jurisprudence, and further contributes to the fields of axiomatic bargaining, dynamic pricing, and demand learning in the presence of competitors."--
Book Synopsis Product Rankings, AI Pricing Algorithms, and Collusion by : Liying Qiu
Download or read book Product Rankings, AI Pricing Algorithms, and Collusion written by Liying Qiu and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Reinforcement learning (RL) based pricing algorithms have been shown to tacitly collude to set supra-competitive prices in oligopoly models of repeated price competition. We investigate the impact of ranking systems, a common feature of online marketplaces, on algorithmic collusion in prices. We study experimentally the behavior of algorithms powered by Artificial Intelligence (deep Q-learning) in a workhorse duopoly model of repeated price competition in the presence of product rankings. Through extensive experiments, we find that the introduction of the ranking system significantly mitigates the tacit collusion that stems from RL based pricing. The ranking system increases the incentives for the RL agents to deviate from a collusive price which in turn requires more complicated punishment strategies to prevent deviation and sustain collusive prices. These punishment strategies are harder to learn for RL algorithms in non stationary environments and the high collusive prices are not sustained as a result. The ranking system's mitigation effect is moderated by the horizontal differentiation between the products offered by the firms and the stickiness of product ranks. In particular, when products are more horizontally differentiated from each other and when past sales have a larger influence on product ranks (sticky ranking), the prices charged by the two firms are higher and the ranking system's mitigation effect is weaker. However, in both cases, prices in the presence of ranking are lower than that in the absence of ranking. Our analysis sheds light on the impact of ranking systems on consumer welfare and on design of ranking systems to prevent algorithmic pricing collusion.
Book Synopsis Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory by : Tim Roughgarden
Download or read book Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory written by Tim Roughgarden and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2016-08-30 with total page 356 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.
Book Synopsis Big Data and Competition Policy by : Maurice E. Stucke
Download or read book Big Data and Competition Policy written by Maurice E. Stucke and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first text to provide understanding of the important new issue of Big Data and how it relates to competition laws and policy, both in the EU and US.
Book Synopsis What Do We Know About Algorithmic Collusion Now? New Insights from the Latest Academic Research by : Ai Deng
Download or read book What Do We Know About Algorithmic Collusion Now? New Insights from the Latest Academic Research written by Ai Deng and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Algorithmic collusion has captured the attention of the global antitrust community for the past several years. Deng (2020) provided a comprehensive survey of the pertinent literature in economics and computer science and a critical discussion. Over the past three years, new insights have emerged from academic research. These new insights have not only deepened our understanding of the intricate relationship between algorithms and competition but also begun challenging some previous findings once considered compelling evidence supporting the plausibility of autonomous algorithmic tacit collusion. In this article, I discuss these new insights, with a focus on four topics: (1) the nuanced ways algorithms affect prices, (2) the crucial role of algorithmic design, (3) the consequences of third-party pricing algorithms, and (4) some considerations when assessing algorithmic impact in litigation.
Book Synopsis Algorithmic Collusion by : Karsten T. Hansen
Download or read book Algorithmic Collusion written by Karsten T. Hansen and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 25 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Motivated by their increasing prevalence, we study outcomes when competing sellers use machine learning algorithms to run real-time dynamic price experiments. These algorithms are often misspecified, ignoring the effect of factors outside their control, e.g. competitors' prices. We show that the long-run prices depend on the informational value (or signal to noise ratio) of price experiments: if low, the long-run prices are consistent with the static Nash equilibrium of the corresponding full information setting. However, if high, the long-run prices are supra-competitive -- the full information joint-monopoly outcome is possible. We show this occurs via a novel channel: competitors' algorithms' prices end up running correlated experiments. Therefore, sellers' misspecified models overestimate own price sensitivity, resulting in higher prices. We discuss the implications on competition policy.
Book Synopsis Algorithms & Pricing by : Céline Geissmann
Download or read book Algorithms & Pricing written by Céline Geissmann and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 84 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy by : Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.
Download or read book The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy written by Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2017-11-16 with total page 145 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement. The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion.
