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A Study Of Ceo Compensation And Firm Performance Across Companies With High Medium And Low Managerial Discretion
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Book Synopsis A Study of CEO Compensation and Firm Performance Across Companies with High, Medium and Low Managerial Discretion by : Richard Murphy
Download or read book A Study of CEO Compensation and Firm Performance Across Companies with High, Medium and Low Managerial Discretion written by Richard Murphy and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 246 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Manipulation Effects of Managerial Discretion on Executive Compensation by : Changzheng Zhang
Download or read book Manipulation Effects of Managerial Discretion on Executive Compensation written by Changzheng Zhang and published by Nova Science Publishers. This book was released on 2016 with total page 225 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Facing with the ever increasing change of the business environment, the firms have recognized that their persistent competitive edge increasingly depends on whether or not they own the dedicated, experienced and capable CEOs. In the global practice, more and more firms have tried, or are trying, or will try to change their CEOs in order to get higher firm performance or just to get out of recession. Especially it is true in China. However, in theory, the literature in the related fields, such as the corporate governance, the strategic human resource management, the strategy management, the principal-agent theory and so on, has only addressed how to arrange managerial discretion and executive compensation reasonably under the normal circumstances, while ignoring the conditions of CEO change. Therefore, each stakeholder in the post-CEO change period has no clear theoretical guidances on how to reallocate managerial discretion and reset executive compensation for the fresh CEOs. Such a theoretical research gap has leaded to a large number of failures in the issue of CEO change. In order to make up this gap, this book tries to investigate the relationship between managerial discretion and executive compensation under the conditions of CEO change, which can not only practically guide the re-balancing of the corporate governance and further improve the success possibility of CEO change, but can theoretically enrich the contributions in managerial discretion approach and executive compensation theory. Based on the comparative study perspective, by drawing on the data from Chinese listed companies as the sample and adopting the Correlation Analysis, Multiple Linear Regression and Hierarchical Models as the statistical analysis methods, the book investigates how managerial discretion, respectively for the fresh CEOs and the senior CEOs, manipulates each dimension of executive compensation, i.e. executive compensation level, CEO pay-performance sensitivity, executive compensation gap and executive-employee compensation gap. The book makes two valuable new findings: First, the book confirms that both the fresh CEOs and the senior CEOs have the motives and capabilities to manipulate each dimension of executive compensation, but varying by intent and intention; Second, the book proves that the fresh CEOs show higher firm-serving motives when they manipulate each dimension of executive compensation by performing managerial discretion, while the senior CEOs show relatively higher self-serving motives. Based on the research results, the book builds the fresh-keeping mechanisms of firm-serving motives of the fresh CEOs during their whole CEO tenure, which are of great meanings for the government, the scholars and the practitioners and so on.
Book Synopsis CEO Pay and Firm Performance by : Paul L. Joskow
Download or read book CEO Pay and Firm Performance written by Paul L. Joskow and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study explores the dynamic structure of the pay-for- performance relationship in CEO compensation and quantifies the effect of introducing a more complex model of firm financial performance on the estimated performance sensitivity of executive pay. The results suggest that current compensation responds to past performance outcomes, but that the effect decays considerably within two years. This contrasts sharply with models of infinitely persistent performance effects implicitly assumed in much of the empirical compensation literature. We find that both accounting and market performance measures influence compensation and that the salary and bonus component of pay as well as total compensation have become more sensitive to firm financial performance over the past two decades. There is no evidence that boards fail to penalize CEOs for poor financial performance or reward them disproportionately well for good performance. Finally, the data suggest that boards may discount extreme performance outcomes -both high and low - relative to performance that lies within some `normal' band in setting compensation.
Book Synopsis Origin of CEO and Compensation Strategy by : Yoshio Yanadori
Download or read book Origin of CEO and Compensation Strategy written by Yoshio Yanadori and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis An Empirical Study of Executive Management Team Compensation and Company Performance by : Gregory A. Jonas
Download or read book An Empirical Study of Executive Management Team Compensation and Company Performance written by Gregory A. Jonas and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 218 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Increasing compensation disclosures mandated by the Securities Exchange Commission provide transparency that allows more shareholders to question the results produced by highly compensated executives. The popular business press often decries the apparent imbalance between executive pay and firm performance. Published academic research has responded with hundreds of studies attempting to explain executive pay in terms of firm performance. The preponderance of these studies focus on Chief Executive Officers. This study empirically examines executive compensation for team effects on future firm performance. Applying a firm specific fixed-effects model to a sample of 13,021 firm-year observations from ExecuComp, the current study regresses top management team compensation and control variables on firm performance averaged one, three, and five years following the year of compensation. One accounting based measure of performance (return on assets) and one market based measure of firm performance (shareholder return) is examined over the one three and five year horizons. Consistent with increasing concerns raised by investors regarding excess executive pay, this study finds evidence that higher top management team pay is associated with companies experiencing lower rates of return in the future. However, higher management team pay is associated with higher profits and market value measured in dollars. Theses effects are significantly different between the short-term and long term components of compensation. Although compensation of the team is highly correlated with the CEO, the compensation of the executive team has incremental effects on future firm performance of the company. This study contributes to the executive compensation literature by providing evidence that the compensation of the top management team affects future company performance. The observed impact of management team compensation on company performance is: incremental to CEO effects noted in prior studies, differential between short- and long-term components of compensation, sensitive to the proxy used for company performance, and attenuates over time. These findings suggest that further research on executive management team compensation is merited in order to address an interesting gap in the extant literature.
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value by : Jennifer Carpenter
Download or read book Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value written by Jennifer Carpenter and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-04-17 with total page 159 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.
Book Synopsis Handbook of Leadership Theory and Practice by : Nitin Nohria
Download or read book Handbook of Leadership Theory and Practice written by Nitin Nohria and published by Harvard Business Press. This book was released on 2010-01-26 with total page 838 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Scores of books and articles have been written in the popular press and mainstream marketplace about leadership: who leaders are, what they do, and why they matter. Yet in academia, there is a dearth of rigorous research, journal articles, or doctoral programs focused on leadership as a discipline. Why do top business schools espouse mission statements that promise to "educate the leaders of the future"- yet fail to give leadership its intellectual due? The Handbook of Leadership Theory and Practice seeks to bridge this disconnect. Based on the Harvard Business School Centennial Colloquium "Leadership: Advancing an Intellectual Discipline" and edited by HBS professors Nitin Nohria and Rakesh Khurana, this volume brings together the most important scholars from fields as diverse as psychology, sociology, economics, and history to take stock of what we know about leadership and to set an agenda for future research. More than a means of getting ahead and gaining power, leadership must be understood as a serious professional and personal responsibility. Featuring the thinking of today's most renowned scholars, the Handbook of Leadership Theory and Practice will be a catalyst for elevating leadership to a higher intellectual plane - and help shape the research agenda for the next generation of leadership scholars.
Book Synopsis The Importance of Firm Ownership on CEO Compensation by : Yusuf Nulla
Download or read book The Importance of Firm Ownership on CEO Compensation written by Yusuf Nulla and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This important study in executive compensation topic investigated the importance of firm ownership on the CEO compensation system in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) companies. This research had compared the CEO compensation system of the owner-managed and the management-controlled companies from 2005 to 2010. The research question for this study was: is there a relationship between the CEO cash compensation, the firm size, the accounting firm performance, and the corporate governance, among the owner-managed and the management-controlled companies? It was found that, there was a relationship between the CEO salary, the CEO bonus, the total compensation, the firm size, the accounting firm performance, and the corporate governance, among the owner-managed and the management-controlled companies.
Book Synopsis Explaining Executive Pay by : Lukas Hengartner
Download or read book Explaining Executive Pay written by Lukas Hengartner and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2007-12-31 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Lukas Hengartner shows that both firm complexity and managerial power are associated with higher pay levels. This suggests that top managers are paid for the complexity of their job and that more powerful top managers receive pay in excess of the level that would be optimal for shareholders.
Book Synopsis Executive Pay Dispersion, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance by : Kin-Wai Lee
Download or read book Executive Pay Dispersion, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance written by Kin-Wai Lee and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Much of the research on management compensation focuses on the level and structure of executives' pay. In this study, we examine a compensation element that has not received so far considerable research attention - the dispersion of compensation across managers - and its impact on firm performance. We examine the implications of two theoretical models dealing with pay dispersion - tournament vs. equity fairness. Tournament theory stipulates that a large pay dispersion provides strong incentives to highly qualified managers, leading to higher efforts and improved enterprise performance, while arguments for equity fairness suggest that greater pay dispersion increases envy and dysfunctional behaviour among team members, adversely affecting performance. Consistent with tournament theory, we find that firm performance, measured by either Tobin's Q or stock performance, is positively associated with the dispersion of management compensation. We also document that the positive association between firm performance and pay dispersion is stronger in firms with high agency costs related to managerial discretion. Furthermore, effective corporate governance, especially high board independence, strengthens the positive association between firm performance and pay dispersion. Our findings thus add to the compensation literature a potentially important dimension: managerial pay dispersion.
Book Synopsis Pay Without Performance by : Lucian A. Bebchuk
Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and Earnings Management Under Moral Hazard by : Bo Sun
Download or read book Executive Compensation and Earnings Management Under Moral Hazard written by Bo Sun and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2010-08 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Analyzes executive compensation in a setting where managers may take a costly action to manipulate corporate performance, and whether managers do so is stochastic. Examines how the opportunity to manipulate affects the optimal pay contract, and establishes necessary and sufficient conditions under which earnings management occurs. The author¿s model provides a set of implications on the role earnings management plays in driving the time-series and cross-sectional variation of executive compensation. In addition, the model's predictions regarding the changes of earnings management and executive pay in response to corporate governance legislation are consistent with empirical observations. Charts and tables.
Download or read book Paid to Perform written by Artsi Alanne and published by LAP Lambert Academic Publishing. This book was released on 2010-07 with total page 72 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The aim of this work is to study the relationships between CEO compensation and organizational performance to achieve a better theoretical understanding of this phenomenon and to examine these relationships in publically traded Nordic companies. Theory on CEO compensation and firm performance was studied to develop a CEO Compensation-Performance Model, from which testable hypotheses were derived, focusing on the link between performance and compensation and the links between fixed compensation and short-term performance and contingent compensation and long- term performance. These hypotheses were then tested to examine the validity of the CEO Compensation- Performance Model. No significant relationships were found. There is a lack of a significant relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance in publically traded Nordic firms. This implies that the CEO Compensation-Performance Model does not hold true in the Nordic context.
Book Synopsis CEO Pay and Firm Performance by : Paul L. Joskow
Download or read book CEO Pay and Firm Performance written by Paul L. Joskow and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study explores the dynamic structure of the pay-for- performance relationship in CEO compensation and quantifies the effect of introducing a more complex model of firm financial performance on the estimated performance sensitivity of executive pay. The results suggest that current compensation responds to past performance outcomes, but that the effect decays considerably within two years. This contrasts sharply with models of infinitely persistent performance effects implicitly assumed in much of the empirical compensation literature. We find that both accounting and market performance measures influence compensation and that the salary and bonus component of pay as well as total compensation have become more sensitive to firm financial performance over the past two decades. There is no evidence that boards fail to penalize CEOs for poor financial performance or reward them disproportionately well for good performance. Finally, the data suggest that boards may discount extreme performance outcomes -both high and low - relative to performance that lies within some `normal' band in setting compensation.
Book Synopsis Academy of Management Journal by : Academy of Management
Download or read book Academy of Management Journal written by Academy of Management and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 396 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Elite CEOs written by and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 202 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A particular body of research examines the issue of linking executive pay to firm performance by focusing on the observation that CEO compensation varies widely across firms, even within the same industry. This research assumes that the same compensation model (i.e., structure of the model, explanatory variables, and coefficients on those variables) can be applied to all CEOs. If you will, extant research assumes a one-size-fits-all CEO compensation model approach to empirical analysis. Furthermore, much of this research also examines firm performance and similarly utilizes a one-size-fits-all firm performance model. I develop a proxy for CEO managerial power that I use to rank and classify CEOs into two groups: Elite CEOs (above a cut-off by the ranking) and Non-Elite CEOs (the remaining CEOs). As a note, I demonstrate that ranking the CEOs by my proxy for CEO managerial power is not the same as simply ranking the CEOs by their total direct compensation. My empirical results show that a one-size-fits-all model can be rejected. That is, the estimated coefficients in compensation models and firm performance models are different for Elite CEOs as compared to Non-Elite CEOs. Also, firms with Elite CEOs do not have higher performance. This suggests that Elite CEOs extract excessive compensation due to undue influence over their respective boards rather than to superior performance. These findings have both academic and corporate policy implications.
Book Synopsis A Study of the Relationship Between Firm Performance and CEO Compensation by : Morris C. Attaway
Download or read book A Study of the Relationship Between Firm Performance and CEO Compensation written by Morris C. Attaway and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 488 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
