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A Multi Task Principal Agent Approach To Organizational Form
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Book Synopsis A Multi-Task Principal-Agent Approach to Organizational Form by : David Besanko
Download or read book A Multi-Task Principal-Agent Approach to Organizational Form written by David Besanko and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the choice of organizational forms in a multi-task principal-agent model. We compare a functional organization in which the firm is organized into functional departments such as marketing and R&D to a product-based organization in which the firm is organized into product lines. Managers' compensation can be based on noisy measures of product-line profits. Measures of a functional area's contribution to total profits are not available, however. This effect favors the product organization. However, if there are significant asymmetries between functional area contributions to organizational success and cross-product externalities within functions, organizing along functional lines may dominate the product organization. The functional organization can also dominate when a function is characterized by strong externalities while the other is not.
Book Synopsis A Multi-task Principal-agent Approach to Organizational Form by : David Besanko
Download or read book A Multi-task Principal-agent Approach to Organizational Form written by David Besanko and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 72 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Multi-task Principal-agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design by : Bengt Holmström
Download or read book Multi-task Principal-agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design written by Bengt Holmström and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 47 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Organizational Principles for Multi-Agent Architectures by : Chris van Aart
Download or read book Organizational Principles for Multi-Agent Architectures written by Chris van Aart and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2006-03-30 with total page 207 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: 1. 1 Background In this work, we develop a framework for the design of multi-agent systems inspired by (human) organizational principles. Organizations are complex entities formed to ov- come various limitations of individual agencies, such as cognitive, physical, temporal and institutional limitations. There is a parallel between the complexity of organizations and multi-agent systems. Therefore, we explore the use of concepts, methods and techniques from human organizational design as architectural principles for multi-agent systems. Three research lines are presented: organizational modeling and coordination, interop- ability and agent models. Organizational modeling and coordination are concerned with how resources (i. e. agents) can be identi?ed and related to each other. In order to have agents cooperate, several issues of interoperability have to be addressed. Agent models deal with the design of individual intelligent software agents, taking into account typical features of agent intelligence. Every (human) activity raises two challenges: division of labor and coordi- tion [Mintzberg, 1993]. Division of labor is the decomposition of work (or goals) into various distinct tasks. Coordination refers to managing relations between these tasks to carry out the work. The patterns of division of labor, responsibilities (people who do the work), clustering of responsibilities into units and coordination between units can be de?ned by organizational structures [Galbraith, 1973]. The design of an organization should cover how one or more actors are engaged in one or more tasks, where knowledge, capabilities and resources are distributed.
Book Synopsis A Multi-task Simplified Principal-agent Model by : Jon Lundesgaard
Download or read book A Multi-task Simplified Principal-agent Model written by Jon Lundesgaard and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I by : Luis C. Corchón
Download or read book Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I written by Luis C. Corchón and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2018-02-23 with total page 567 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.
Book Synopsis The Interaction of Task and Asset Allocation in Multi-task Agency Relationships by : Kenneth Stevens Corts
Download or read book The Interaction of Task and Asset Allocation in Multi-task Agency Relationships written by Kenneth Stevens Corts and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 19 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I examine the interplay of task and asset allocation in solving the double moral hazard and multi-task problems that plague complex principal-agent relationships. The results offer insight into several important issues in organizational design, including why firms rather than workers so often own assets, why fully delegating all tasks and asset ownership (as in turnkey construction contracts) may not solve all agency problems, and why teamproduction may have advantages over assembly line production.
Book Synopsis Multitask Agency and Organizational Form by : Margaret E. Slade
Download or read book Multitask Agency and Organizational Form written by Margaret E. Slade and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 27 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Handbook of Organizational Economics by : Robert S. Gibbons
Download or read book The Handbook of Organizational Economics written by Robert S. Gibbons and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2013 with total page 1248 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: (E-book available via MyiLibrary) In even the most market-oriented economies, most economic transactions occur not in markets but inside managed organizations, particularly business firms. Organizational economics seeks to understand the nature and workings of such organizations and their impact on economic performance. The Handbook of Organizational Economics surveys the major theories, evidence, and methods used in the field. It displays the breadth of topics in organizational economics, including the roles of individuals and groups in organizations, organizational structures and processes, the boundaries of the firm, contracts between and within firms, and more.
Book Synopsis Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision by : Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer
Download or read book Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision written by Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer and published by Springer. This book was released on 2019-02-19 with total page 211 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I.
Book Synopsis Handbook of Research on Competitive Strategy by : Giovanni Battista Dagnino
Download or read book Handbook of Research on Competitive Strategy written by Giovanni Battista Dagnino and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2012-01-01 with total page 617 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Handbook of Research on Competitive Strategy presents a comprehensive state-of-the-art picture of current strategic management issues and demarcates the major investigation strands that are likely to shape the field into the future. The Handbook is the outcome of a far-reaching endeavour including new contributions from highly-reputed experts around the world, outlining the conceptual and empirical advancements and assessing the promises and practical relevance of the competitive strategy field. Looking at key areas such as alliances and innovation, ownership and networks, coopetition and entrepreneurship, multinational and trust management, and firm's financial structures and business models, the book sets a research agenda for the future of competitive strategy research. Gathering various solid branches of investigation that revolve around specific theories and applications (such as the socio-cognitive perspective, the strategy-as-practice view, and the most recent developments in competitive dynamics and the resource-based perspective of the firm), this inspiring and thought-provoking Handbook will provide executives, entrepreneurs, students and scholars in management with many insights into the nature and process of competitive strategy emergence, configuration and development.
Book Synopsis Optimal Contracts in Multitask Principal/agent Framework by : Valérie Rabassa
Download or read book Optimal Contracts in Multitask Principal/agent Framework written by Valérie Rabassa and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Bulletin written by and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 122 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Bureaucracy’s Masters and Minions by : Eleanor L. Schiff
Download or read book Bureaucracy’s Masters and Minions written by Eleanor L. Schiff and published by Rowman & Littlefield. This book was released on 2020-07-23 with total page 157 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In Bureaucracy’s Masters and Minions: The Politics of Controlling the U.S. Bureaucracy, the author argues that political control of the bureaucracy from the president and the Congress is largely contingent on an agency’s internal characteristics of workforce composition, workforce responsibilities, and workforce organization. Through a revised principal-agent framework, the author explores an agent-principal model to use the agent as the starting-point of analysis. The author tests the agent-principal model across 14 years and 132 bureaus and finds that both the president and the House of Representatives exert influence over the bureaucracy, but agency characteristics such as the degree of politization among the workforce, the type of work the agency is engaged in, and the hierarchical nature of the agency affects how agencies are controlled by their political masters. In a detailed case study of one agency, the U.S. Department of Education, the author finds that education policy over a 65-year period is elite-led, and that that hierarchical nature of the department conditions political principals’ influence. This book works to overcome three hurdles that have plagued bureaucratic studies: the difficulty of uniform sampling across the bureaucracy, the overuse of case studies, and the overreliance on the principal-agent theoretical approach.
Book Synopsis The Theory of Incentives by : Jean-Jacques Laffont
Download or read book The Theory of Incentives written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2009-12-27 with total page 436 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
Book Synopsis Peace Research Abstracts Journal by :
Download or read book Peace Research Abstracts Journal written by and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 312 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Public Ends, Private Means by : Alexander S. Preker
Download or read book Public Ends, Private Means written by Alexander S. Preker and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 2007-01-01 with total page 440 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Great progress has been made in recent years in securing better access and financial protection against the cost of illness through collective financing of health care. Managing scarce resources effectively and efficiently is an important part of this story. Experience has shown that, without strategic policies and focused spending, the poor are likely to get left out. The use of purchasing to enhance public sector performance is well-documented in other sectors. Extension to the health sector of lessons from this experience is now successfully implemented in many developing countries. Public.
